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UWMCED strongly believes that informed public debate is vital to the development
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potential impact of LRT in Milwaukee, UWMC ED hopes to contribute to informed
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Researchers at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for Economic
Development (UWMCED) have studied the potential economic consequences of a light
rail transit (LRT) system in the Milwaukee region. We examined the available evidence
on the economic development arid land-use impact of fixed rail systems in cities such
as Portland, Buffalo, Toronto, Baltimore, St. Louis, Atlanta, and San Francisco, and
have reviewed public policies used in various cities to encourage economic benefits
from urban rail investments. In addition, UWMCED used an input- output model to
estimate the impact of the proposed LRT system on regional employment, earnings,
and output.
The UWMCED study concludes that, although the economic benefits of LRT should
not be oversold and will require supportive public policies to be fully realized, a light rail
system could contribute significantly to economic development in the city of
Milwaukee and in the entire region . Our chief findings:

Employment, Output, and Income Impact

LRT will provide an important public works stimulus to the regional economy.
Using an input-output model of the regional economy, UWMCED estimates that during
the four or five year construction phase of the project, 6,041 jobs will be created. This
total includes jobs directly created in' construction and related employment, as well as
the employment that occurs as the initial expenditures for LRT ripple through the
regional economy.
UWMCED estimates an increase of $365 million (in 1990 dollars) in total output in
the Milwaukee region as an LRT system is constructed. Total wages would increase by
$179 million, with state and local governments receiving an increased $44 million in
taxes.
Operating and maintaining the LRT system could generate an estimated 625
permanent jobs in the Milwaukee region.
The long-term economic impact of LRT can be augmented by creative local
procurement and industrial policies. Cities such as Montreal have used rail
investments to spin-off several mass transit-related industries, and Los Angeles is
considering a similar strategy by attempting the local production of rail vehicles
heretofore imported from Japan.
UWMCED estimates, that if light rail vehicles for the Milwaukee system were
produced locally, an additional 959, mostly family-supporting jobs could be created in
the region, producing $80.8 million in additional output, and $29.0 million in wages in
the four county Milwaukee metropolitan area.
In light of this potential, UWMCED recommends that the City of Milwaukee and
State of Wisconsin strongly explore the possibility of using LRT investments as a
strategic linchpin for the development of a Milwaukee - based mass transit
manufacturing industry.

Land Use and Neighborhood Development Impacts

There is little evidence that fixed-rail systems have meaningfully altered patterns of
employment decentralization and residential sprawl in North American metropolitan
areas.
On the other hand, cities such as Atlanta, Portland, and Toronto provide good
examples of development activity around system routes and station locations.
UWMCED concludes that light rail can have a modest, but positive impact on
neighborhood development and land use.
Fixed rail transit offers the opportunity for development, but, in itself, is usually not
sufficient to spur significant spin -off development around routes and stations. The
experience of cities ' examined by UWMCED suggests that transit-related development
requires coordination of transit planning, economic development, and land use policies.
The "Field of Dreams" approach to transit and economic development -- "if we build a
station, developers will come" -- is rarely successful.
One of the lessons learned from other cities is that decisive and active public policy
may be required to achieve even modest development impacts of LRT, especially in
station-areas located in neighborhoods with weak private investment markets.
Therefore, UWMCED concludes that city, county, and state governments should
take an active approach toward stimulating development around the LRT routes in this
region. In addition, a broad, participatory process should be established at an early
stage in the planning process, so that neighborhood development issues are considered
in route alignment and station location decisions. LRT will be one of the largest public
infrastructure investments ever undertaken in Milwaukee. As such, it is imperative that
local policies and co mplementary redevelopment resources be coordinated to maximize
its economic impact.
Light Rail, the Inner City~ and
Economic Development

Mino~ity

The record in urban America on using rail transit investments to revitalize inner city
neighborhoods or promote minority economic development is not a strong one.
However, given the magnitude of the economic problems facing Milwaukee's inner city
and the rare opportunity offered by a major public works investment such as LRT to
inject resources from the federal government into the central city, UWMCED believes it
is essential that Milwaukee develop a stra"tegy to successfully link LRT to inner city
revitalization.
UWMCED concludes that if inner city and minority concerns are properly considered
in transit planning, building a light rail system could yield significant economic Benefits
for the inner city and for minorities. Specifically, we recommend the following policies:
1. Explicit minority hiring and contracting requirements
in the constructio~ and operation of LRT;
2. Implementation of reindustrialization strategies
around mass transit manufacturing in Milwaukee;

3 . Creation of public-private partnerships for
development around inner city LRT station -areas;
4 . Public investment to enhance the market for
investment around inner city stations;
5. Routing of light rail lines to improve access of inner
city residents to industrial parks and suburban
employment locations.
No city has ever implemented all these approaches in building fixed rail systems,
and as a result there have been limited economic benefits for inner city residents.
Milwaukee has an opportunity, with this ' major public investment, to establish new and
productive links between mass transit and minority economic development.
Therefore, UWMCED recommends the formation of an Inner City-Light Rail Task
Force whose purpose would be to develop concrete and explicit plans to maximize the
economic benefits of LRT for Milwaukee's inner city.
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INTROD UCTION
Serious planning is now underway for what could become a $417 million, 18.4
mile light rail transit system (LRT) in Milwaukee. In 1991 , a team of transit
consultants prepared an LRT feasibility study for the City of Milwaukee, Department of
Public Works. In their report, the Southeastern Wisconsin Transit Corridor Study, the
consultants recommended an initial 18.4 mile LRT alignment that would be anchored in
downtown Milwaukee, with three main spurs: northeast, to the campus of the
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; west, to the Milwaukee County Grounds; and
northwest, to Mill Road. Future extensions could occur south, linking downtown to
Mitchell International Airport, extending the system an additional 7.4 miles at an
estimated cost of $165 million, and further west from the County Grounds to
Waukesha (an additional 10.4 miles at an estimated cost of $190 million). The
configuration analyzed in this study, however, is the initial 18.4 mile alignment deemed
feasible in the June 1991 Southeastern Wisconsin Transit Corridor Study (BRW, Inc. et
aI., 1991,95).
In the fall of 1 991 , the Federal Transportation Act authorized $ 200 million to be
spent on the "East-West" corridor, running from the County Grounds through
downtown Milwaukee to UWM; once state and local officials agree on the project. The
State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation is now overseeing another team of
consultants --Milwaukee Transit Associates -- who are conducting a $ 2 million
"alternatives ana lysis" to examine in detail the costs and benefits of light rai I,
compared to other mass transit options, in this East-West corridor.
There are numerous reasons to consider the construction of light rail transit in
Milwaukee, or any major city for that matter. The exigencies of the Clean Air Act, the
desirability of energy conservation, and the economic inefficiencies caused by traffic
congestion in high-growth corridors all provide compelling reasons to seriously analyze
new transit alternatives that will attract riders and ease environmental, energy, and
transportation problems in the region. All of these iss'ues presumably will be studied in
depth in the Milwaukee transit alternatives analysis scheduled for completion in early
~

1993.

Researchers at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for Economic
Development (UWMCED), however, have focused on a different matter: the potential
economic development impact of a light rail system on the city of Milwaukee and,
indeed, the entire four county regional economy. This expanded view of the objectives
of rail transit became an element of federal policy in 1978:
In particular, rail transit should be viewed as part of
a strategy to promote broader national purposes. Its
effectiveness should be measured not just in terms of
its ability to move people, but in terms of its positive
influence on the long -term patterns of urban growth.
Specifically, rail transit can help our in nation's efforts
to revitalize distressed cities ... (Skinner and Deen,

1982,270-271).
Today, transportation planners regularly argue that rail transit investments can
potentially playa major role in shaping patterns of development and influencing the ·
economic vitality of cities and regions.
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UWMCED has extensively examined the experiences of other communities with
fixed rail systems to forecast how a proposed light rail system might affect the
Milwaukee economy, as well as influence patterns of land use and neighborhood
development here. Our analysis concludes that there could indeed be substantial
economic benefits for Milwaukee in developing a light rail system, but that these
benefits are neither certain nor automatic.
Particularly in economically distressed neighborhoods in the region, with weak
private investment markets, LRT will not spontaneously stimulate economic growth or
neighborhood redevelopment. Although the immediate stimulus of public works
expenditures from LRT will create jobs and output in the Milwaukee economy,
maximizing the long-term economic development potential from LRT requires the
extensive coordination of transit planning and economic development initiatives, and
innovative and active local government policies.
Milwaukee currently faces daunting economic challenges, particularly in the
impoverished, predominantly African American neighborhoods of its inner-city. As one
of the largest investments in public works ever undertaken in the Milwaukee area,
there rightfully will be high expectations that light rail make a substantial contribution
toward alleviating these problems. The burden placed on LRT should not be too
heavy: it is by no means the panacea to all economic problems facing the Milwaukee
region. Nor should light rail be oversold; in no city examined by UWMCED have recent
rail transit investments magically or comprehensively reshaped the local economy or
patterns of land use. However, as a major expenditure of taxpayers' money that could
significantly influence land use and economic development in this region, public
authorities who will plan and build this system have a fundamental obligation to ensure
that maximum economic benefits are derived from this investment, particularly for
those communities in the Milwaukee region in the greatest need. In providing
background on the economic development record of fixed rail systems in other cities,
and by furnishing 'concrete forecasts regarding the potential impact of LRT in
Milwaukee, UWMCED hopes to contribute to informed discussion as policymakers and
the general public consider the merits of plans for a light
rail system in the region.
,
.
The plan of this study is as follows: Section I provides an overview of light rail
transit, including basic characteristics of recently built systems in U.S. cities, and a
brief discussion of some recent controversies regarding ridership and cost forecasts.
Section II explores the potential impact of the construction and operation of an LRT
system on employment, output, and wages in the Milwaukee region. Section III
provides an extensive comparative overview of the land use and neighborhood
development impacts of fixed rail investments in cities such as Atlanta, Baltimore, St.
Louis, San Francisco, Portland, and Toronto, and attempts to identify some policy
implications from those experiences. Section IV examines how cities have used rail
transit investments in conjunction with tools of industrial policy to promote transitrelated industries and employment. Finally, Section V focuses explicitly on the
potential connections between LRT and inner-city revitalization .
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SECTION I:
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT: AN OVERVIEW
Before proceeding with an analysis of the potential economic impact of light rail
transit in Milwaukee, it would be useful to identify the chief characteristics of such
systems . Light rail transit has been defined by the Transportation Research Board as
follows:
Light rail transit is a mode of ur.ban transportation that
uses predominantly ,reserved, but not necessarily
grade-separated rights-of-way. Electrically propelled
vehicl'es operate singly or in trains. Light rail transit
provides a wide range of passenger capacities and
performance characteristics at moderate costs
(Schumann, 1989, 9).
"Heavy rail" or rapid rail transit systems, like those in Atlanta, San Francisco,
Montreal, or Washington, D.C., operate with high-platform vehicles, driven by power
from an electrified third rail. These systems typically operate on exclusive rights -ofway (in tunnels or elevated structures), and ordinarily with trains of several cars. On
the other hand, modern LRT operates more flexibly, either on separated rights-of-way
or in highly urban, "streetcar-style" settings, with one or several railcars. The capital
costs of LRT are generally much less per mile than for rapid rail transit because of the
limited use of grade -separated rights-of-way in LRT, and because less tunneling and
neighborhood disruption is typically required in LRT.
Given their substantial capital costs, to even approach financial feasibility rapid rail
systems require extr'emely high population densities, major concentrations of economic
activity downtown, and extremely high daily passenger volumes (Pushkarev and
Zupan, 1982, 341-342). Few medium sized cities contain the necessary densities,
which is one reason why LRT became increasingly viewed as the only viable fixed rail
transit alternative for cities currently contemplating rail transit. Viewed simply from
the criterion of requisite densities, Pushkarev and Zupan concluded in 1977 that LRT
might be feasible in around 30 mid-sized U.S. cities, of which Milwaukee would be
one.
As John W. Schumann points out, LRT systems ca,n be developed to serve three
main categories of urban travel:

* Line haul transit from city and suburban residential
areas to central business districts and other
employment zones;

* Feeder service to rapid transit or commuter rail;
* Local area transit within a portion of an urbani ze d
area or activity (Schumann, 1989, 11).

Schumann claims that "the ability to perform multiple transit functions is an
advantage of LRT, which combines some operational characteristics of both bus and
rapid transit modes. LRT can approach rapid transit commercial speeds to attract line
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haul traffic; but ease of access to simple at-grade stations and typically shorter station
spacings also allow LRT to attract local ridership" (Schumann, 1989, 11).
This flexibility can be seen in recently built systems --such as Portland's MAX-- as
well as LRT systems under construction such as St. Louis' Metro Link or Baltimore's
Central Light Rail Line. All of these systems were designed to carry suburban
commuters to downtown; to provide some service for local passengers between
su burba n orig ins and desti nati ons; and to offer" short ho p" service within the
downtown core and city neighborhoods. In addition, the St. Louis and Baltimore
systems were designed with at least some attention to so-called "reverse commuting,"
in which city residents utilize transit for access to growing employment centers in the
suburbs.
Flexibility, when compared to heavy rail, is at the heart of LRT's cost advantage.
LRT can run automated on segregated right-of-way, then use a driver to operate over
less expensive, non-exclusive alignments. In areas lacking exclusive rights-of-way, light
rail can run on a street or bypass an historic or otherwise valuable building, avoidin_g in
many cases the high expense of property acquisition, destruction, and reassembly.
Particularly in areas with multiple property owners, such a process can be time consuming and expensive, which has been one contributor to the high costs of building
heavy rail systems (Parkinson, 1989, 67 -68).
Tables 1 and 2 provide some data on the characteristics of recent light rail systems
in U.S. cities. These data reveal the different configurations that LRT can have in
different urban settings. Capital costs vary, depending, among other factors, on the
amount of separate, or newly created right - of-way used, whether a subway
component is required, and what mix of elaborate stations or bare-bones transit
"shelters" are constructed.
Ridership on, and the costs of, LRT have become controversial topics since the
publicati on in October 1990 of a study conducted for the U. S. D'e partment of
Transportation by Don H. Pickrell. The report, Urban Rail Transit Projects: Forecast
Versus Actual Ridership and Cost, reveals significant disparities between ridership and
cost forecasts for recent light rail systems in Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Por~land, and
Sacramento, and actual ridership and cost figures. According to Pickrell, the actual
weekday passengers riding these LRT systems ranges from 54 percent (Portland) to 71
percent (Sacramento) below their forecast levels (U.S. Department of Transportation,
1990, xi). Moreover, Pickrell argues that these figures "actually understate the gap
between forecasts and actual ridership on the four light rail lines. The actual
passenger data for Buffalo, Portland, and Sacramento include as many as 20 percent
who are traveling within free or reduced -fare zones within these cities' downtowns,
but who were not included in forecasts of ridership" (Pickrell, 1992, 160; emphasis in
original) .
On the subject of costs, with the exception of Pittsburgh's S'outh Hills LRT
reconstruction project, which actually cost 11 percent less than forecast, actual capital
expenditures for Sacramento (13 percent), Buffalo (51 percent), and Portland (55
percent) were significantly higher than originally forecast. Annual operating expenses
also exceeded original forecasts in Buffalo and Portland, while falling 10 percent below
forecast levels in Sacramento. Although some of these disparities are striking, it should
be pointed out that they are substantially lower than comparable figures for heavy rail
systems.
Pickrell's findings have been disputed by many transit planners. For example,
Portland's Tri -Met, the authority operating the MAX light rail system, claims that
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MAX's construction costs were $7.5 million under the budget established in its 1982
final funding agreement with the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA), and that
Pickrell based his conclusion of "cost overruns" on earlier estimates

Table 1:
Characteristics of Recent Light Rail Transit Systems:
Size and Ridership

City

Portland
Sacramento
Buffalo
Pittsburgh
San Jose
Baltimore *
St. Louis *
Milwaukee *

Line Length
Miles

15.1
18.3
6.4
22.5
20.4
22.5 **
18.1
18.4

LRVS
Number

Stations
Number

26
26
27
60
50
31
31

29
29
14
34
33
24
20

NA

NA

Weekday
Ridership

24,000
24,400
29,000
27,300
13,000
33,000
37,000
68,000

* Forecasts for systems not yet ope'r ating
* * Extensions already planned will increase length to
25.0 miles and the number of stations to 30 by 1994

Sources: Schumann (1989); U.S. Department of Transportation (1990); BRW, Inc. et aI.,
(1991); local transit authorities

made before the final scope of MAX was determined (Tri -Met, 1 ~90) . - Similarly,
Portland officials criticize the Pickrell study for unfairly "holding them" to ridership
forecasts made in 1978, but later revised when economic assumptions underpinning
these forecasts changed. Indeed, in a recent article, Pickrell acknowledges that
"forecasts of ridershi p and operating statistics for Portland's light rail line both apply to
the year 1990, by which time the line was anticipated to be in its seventh year of
operation . Yet, because operation did not begin until September 1986, the most
recent actual data apply to a period beginning only four years after its completion"
(Pickrell, 1992, 173).
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Table 2:
Characteristics of Recent Light Rail Transit Systems:
Comparative Costs
City

Portland
Sacramento
Buffalo
Pittsburgh .
San Jose .
Baltimore
St. Louis
Milwaukee

Year Opened

1986
1987
1985
1987
1991
1992
1993
NA

Capital
Costs/Mile
(in original$)
(in millions)

214
176
535
842
552
446
342
417

14.2
9.6
83.6
37.4
27.2
20.3
19.0
22.7

Operating
Costs/Mile
(in millions $)

6.4
7.6
12.8
8.9
16.5
14.7
9.8
15.3

.424
.420
2.000
.396
.808
.668 *
.541 *
.832 *

* Baltimore's and St. Louis' operating costs are estimates; all Milwaukee data
are forecasts from BRW, Inc, report
Sources: See Table 1

Although some transit planners with whom UWMCED has spoken privately
admitted to some inflation in ridership forecasts submitted to UMTA in transit system
planning, these local planners complained that the Pickrell/UMTA report unfairly held
cities accountable for forecasts that UMTA at least tacitly understood and implicitly
expected would be on the optimistic side. Pickrell himself, in a recent article, contends
that the current structure of transit grant programs "increasingly leads officials to
encourage their planning staffs and consultants to underestimate rail transit projects'
costs and overestimate their prospective benefits ... " (Pickrell, 1992, 169).
The economic importance of LRT system costs is obvious, as is the importance of
accurate forecasts . If LRT is prone to substantial cost overruns, or if operating costs
are significantly greater than forecast, then the prospects for recovering a respectable
portion of system costs from farebox revenues will diminish, and the burden on local
taxpayers commensurately increase. However, the evidence on cost overruns from
LRT is more ambiguous than the anti-LRT factions who have seized upon the Pickrell
study have suggested. Although Buffalo's LRT unquestionably cost much more than
previewed, recent systems in Sacramento, San Diego, Pittsburgh, Portland (if Tri-Met's
arguments are accepted), and Baltimore have all come in under, at, or very close to
forecast. Similarly, there is no consistent pattern regarding operating expenses . At a
minimum, unlike the nearly uniform record of major cost overruns associated with
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heavy rail systems in the 1960s and 1970s, LRT cannot be assumed, a priori, to be a
transit investment that will cost taxpayers more than advertised.
Although it is a central transportation issue, ridership is also a factor in gauging the
economic impact of transit investments : The volume of ridership is obviously crucial to
the success of LRT systems in defraying some of their costs through farebox revenues.
Moreover, the extent to which regions derive increases in productivity from more
efficient commuting patterns on mass transit will, by definition, be contingent on how
many commuters actually patronage an LRT system. Finally, as we explore in section
III of this report, daily ridership volume is the cornerstone of rail transit-generated
development around stations and in transit corridors.
Since our emphasis is on econ,omic development analysis, not transportation
planning, UWMCED did not attempt to forecast daily ridership levels on a potential
Milwaukee LRT system. However, we have provided, in Table 2, data from other LRT
systems to permit some comparative perspective as forecasts for Milwaukee are
produced. An early ridership prognostication, in the Southeast Wisconsin Transit
Corridor Study, estimated 68,000 daily weekday passengers for an 18.4 mile sysfem
configuration in Milwaukee. Although we have not attempted to verify the reliability of
this estimate, we do note that it is almost triple the current actual ridership levels on
similar length systems in San Jose, Portland, and Sacramento, and much higher than
the ridership projections for the new Baltimore and St. Louis LRT routes. It is even
higher than the overly optimistic forecasts that were produced for Portland; in fact, the
only LRT forecast that was higher was the wildly off-the-mark 92,000 daily riders
forecast for Buffalo's LRT. System proponents in Milwaukee should be careful in
estimating potential LRT ridership; forecasts that are found to be significantly
inaccurate, or strongly at odds with the experience in other communities, can only
undermine support for transit investments in Milwaukee.
Whether people patronize transit depends on numerous factors: the attractiveness,
convenience, speed, and efficiency of mass transit versus the ease of commuting by
automobile. One crucial variable apparently associated with ridership success is the
existence of "activity centers --concentrations of employment or college students,
whether they are in a downtown metropolitan core or in fringe areas or suburban
activity centers" (Cushman, 1987, 27). Individuals are likely to use transit in
commuting to dense activity centers where auto transportation loses some of its
convenience advantage, especially if parking regulations in those centers favor transit
over automobiles. As Table 3 indicates, Milwaukee appears to have a downtown core
at least comparable to other similar sized Frostbelt cities (and cities such as
Sacramento and Portland with LRT). UW-Milwaukee and the Milwaukee County
Grounds, planned at this time as the East and West terminuses for Milwaukee's LRT
system, also seem to constitute the types of activity concentrations likely to attract
transit ridership. Thus, although some early ridership forecasts for LRT in Milwaukee
seem excessively optimistic, there is reason to believe that Milwauke.e s LRT system
would attract ridership volume at least comparable to levels achieved in cities such as
Portland, Buffalo, and Sacramento, and forecast for Baltimore and St. Louis.
I

A final overview issue relating to the economics of LRT is system financing. Few
U.S. cities attract the kind of daily mass transit patronage found, for example, in
Toronto, where ridership is sufficient to permit recovery of over 70 percent of system
operations and maintenance expenses from farebox revenues (Pill, 1987, 58). The
record of recent LRT systems to date indicates farebox recovery in the 33 to 50
percent range (BRW, pp. 101 - 104; Tri -Met cited above). Estimates from the Southeast
Wisconsin Transit Corridor Study forecast an 88 percent annual operating cost
recovery through fares in the west corridor of its proposed Milwaukee LRT alignment,
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and a 55 percent farebox recovery rate in the UWM corridor (BRW, Inc. et aI., 1991,
98), figures that again appear to be on the high side when viewed in comparative
perspective.

TABLE 3:
Proportion of Metropolitan Labor
Force Employed in Central Business
District, Selected Cities, 1980

City

Percentage of SMSA labor force
Working in CBD, 1980

5.5
6.3
7.5

Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Detroit
Minneapolis/ St. Paul
Pittsburgh
St. Louis
Portland
Sacramento

9.1
10.8
4.4
10.0
10.6

6.6
6.7
5.7

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Journey to Work Census, 1980

In any event, additional local revenues will be required to operate the Milwaukee
LRT system --as well as defray some of the capital costs not covered by federal
funding -- and how those revenues are raised is an important local economic
development consideration. Typically, cities have relied on some forrT) of a sales tax:
Buffalo, Sacramento, S,t. Louis, San Jose, and San Diego are all examples of recent
or new LRT systems that have utilized a sales tax to at least partially offset LRT
expenses. Baltimore IS 100 percent state-funded system relies on the State of
Maryland's Transportation Trust Fund for financing, while Portland has used a payroll
tax and special State of Oregon financing to support the construction and operations
of MAX.
UWMCED has not systematically studied how these differing funding approaches
have affected local economies or residents. However, we do note that, in general,
without special tax credits or offsets, a sales tax is a regressive form of taxation that
disproportionately burdens lower-income residents in a community. As consideration
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of LRT in Milwaukee moves toward concrete discussion of financing alternatives, the
impact of various options on local residents needs to be closely scrutinized, to
ensure that the burden of funding of LRT is borne fairly and progressively.
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SECTION II:
T HE EFFECTS OF EXPENDITURES
FOR A LIGHT RAIL SYSTEM ON THE MI LWAUKEE
M ETROPOLITAN ECONOM Y
Tran sit Investments and Economic Growth
What is the impact of public infrastructure investment such as LRT on local
economic development? Recent research has clearly demonstrated that public
investment in physical infrastruct~re (roads, bridges, mass transit, etc.) significantly
stimulates private sector productivity, profitability, and investment (Aschauer, 1991;
Munnell, 1990, 1991). A recent study' by David A. Aschauer for the Economic Policy
Institute concludes, on the national level, that "the pay-off in GNP growth from an
extra dollar of public capital is estimated to exceed that of private investment by a
factor of between two and five" (Aschauer, 1991,2) . Aschauer argues that an
important component of declining U.S. productivity growth since the 1970s is
attributable to drops in public infrastructure spending, and that, after a short lag time, "each additional dollar of public investment in infrastructure will raise private
investmerlt by 45 cents" (Aschauer, 1991, 1). The reason: public infrastructure
provides productivity- enhancing services to private firms, such as efficient
transportation. "These public facilities," writes Aschauer, "are as necessary to the
production process as a firm's own capital equipment" (Aschauer, 1991, 1).
A recent report by David Lewis for the Transportation Research Board, while
cautioning against excessive claims on the economic returns of transportation
investments, nevertheless notes that the development and maintenance of
transportation inf~astructure "offers one of the most effective known catalysts of
productivity growth" (Lewis, 1992, 11). Lewis concludes that "transportation
investment ... can trigger technological innovation in private firms, with important
economic gains that extend beyond those previously associated with infrastructure
development" (Lewis, 1992, 11). Saving time and energy by efficient commuting
and the reduction of traffic congestion, saving environmental clean-up costs by
reducing automobile emissions~ saving energy by encouraging efficient land-use --all
of these transit-related benefits contribute to improved private sector productivity
growth.
These potential benefits should not be exaggerated: no studies have yet
demonstrated that major rail transit investments have stimulated structural (i.e.
lasting beyond the immediate stimulus of the construction phase) net increases in a
given region's employment, productivity, output, or real -estate development.
Typically, transportation policies promote local employment at the ,expense of job
creation elsewhere, refocusing economic activity around transit investments rather
than creating net aggregate growth, by making one localized area more "efficient" or
otherwise attractive for investment than anot her (Lewis, 1992, iv, 23).
Nevertheless, the T RB study concludes that employment impact is an important
dimension of evaluating transit investments. Even if the main employm ent gains are
redistributional (Le. from one region to another), the study concludes t hat this

does not mean that transportat ion executives need to
disc a rd employment as a selling point of their
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programs. For there will always be employment in
association with transportation investments even if
job-creation is not the grounds of the investment
decision.
Moreover, employment through
redistribution is often regarded as an objective in
itself. (Lewis, 1992, 23)

Employment, Output, and Wage Effects of lRT in Milwaukee
Even if assessment of the structural employment gains from transit investments is
shrouded in ambiguity, the immediate stimulus provided from a potential investment in
light rail in Milwaukee --manifested in gains in employment, output, and wages-- can
be identified. Using the "Regional Impact Model" developed by the Regional Science
Research Institute (RSRI), UWMCED has estimated the economic impact in the four
county Milwaukee metropolitan area of expenditures for a proposed light rail transit
system.
'
The RSRI model is an input-output model; that is, it identifies how all sectors of the
regional ecqnomy are related. By identifying interindustry linkages, an input-output
model can e'stimate how an initial change in spending (for a factory, convention center,
or light rail system) will produce changes in the employment, output, and income in a
region's economy. In this fashion, input-output models estimate not only the direct
effects of expenditures, but indirect and induced effects that ripple through the
regional economy. Secondary rounds of spending occur as local producers satisfy the
direct demands for goods and services required for the project by making purchases
from other local suppliers. These secondary rounds of interindustry activity, called
indirect effects, further stimulate the local economy. Further impacts, called induced
effects, occur as increased household spending by workers employed to produce
goods and services for the project spend their wages on consumer goods. All of these
rounds of expenditure produce employment, output, and income growth, and the
degree to which an initial direct expenditure produces additional rounds of spending,
employment, or output is called a "multiplier" effect: The magnitude of this effect on
the local economy is contingent on how much "leakage" occurs from the initial
expenditure: that is, how much in the way of materials or services a local project
needs purchase from outside the region, or how much local workers "respend" wages
earned from project work on goods and services produced outside the region. In
general, the less the leakage, the higher the regional multiplier, and the greater the
economic impact of a given project. 1
UWMCED has based its analysis of the economic impact of light rail expenditures
on estimates of capital costs and operations/maintenance expenditures provided us by
the City of Milwaukee, Department of Public Works, Bureau of Engineers. Items
involved in these estimates include the following:

Capital Costs

* Right of way construction, which includes utility relocation, road
relocation, railroad relocation, roadbed and track construction, and
necessary structures such as bridges and tunnels;
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* Support systems, which include electrification systems, signals,
crossing protection, communications, and fare collection machines;
* Stations and parking;

* Maintenance facilities and equipment;
* Light rail vehicles;
* Guideways;
* Land acquisition and relocation;
* Insurance, design and engineering fees, project management, and
contingencies. '
.

Operating and Maintenance Costs

* I n c l u d e s staffing, materials, and fuel required to operate and
maintain system.
The Department of Public Works provided UWMCED with the following breakdown
of capital costs for each of the proposed LRT corridors, cautioning that these estimates
are preliminary and, moreover, as specific alignments in each corridor have not yet
been chosen, the estimates for each cost category represent an average of all potential
alignments within that corridor. All estimates are in millions of dollars:

UWM Corridor:

12.66
6.53
7.03
10.26
12.25
.52
11.30
9.85

Right of way construction
. Stations and parking
Maintenance Facilities/Equipment
Support systems
Vehicles
Right of way
Contingencies
Engineering and Manage.ment
Total: UWM Corridor

70.40
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West Corridor:
65.86
12.91
13.01
23.79
30.45
6.04
37.15
30.41

Right of way construction
Stations and parking
Maintenance Facilities/Equipment
Support Systems
Vehicles
Right of Way
Contingencies
Engineering and Management

219.62

Total: West Corridor

Northwest Corridor:
.64
63.82
9.50
8.27
44.27

Land Acquisition and Relocation
Guideways and Stations
Vehicles :
Yard and Shop Complex
Percentage Add-Ons

127.00

Total: Northwest Corridor

TOTAL: PROPOSED INITIAL LRT SYSTEM

417.02

The annual operating expenses for the prop'osed initial LRT configuration,
derived from the Southeastern Wisconsin Transit Corridor Study and the Milwaukee
Northwest Corridor Rapid Transit Study, range from $15.3 million to $19.4 million.
UWMCED has made estimates of. the employment, output, and wage impact of both
levels of expenditure.

Economic Impact of LRT: The Construction Phase
Using these DPW figures on LRT capital and operations costs, UWMCED
estimates that the construction of a light rail system would create 6,041 jobs,
increase local output by $365,300,300, and increase local wages by $178,719,200
during the construction phase of the project. In addition, we estimate that LRT
construction would generate an additional $27,382,500 in state taxes, $16,258,600
in local taxes, and $56,008,600 in federal taxes during this period. The construction
phase for recent LRT systems (Portland, Sacramento, San Jose, Baltimore, and St.
Louis) has ranged between four and five years. Thus, these Milwaukee figures
represent estimates of cumulative impacts to occur over a 4-5 year construction
period. 2
Of the $417 . 02 million earmarked for the project, our input-output model
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suggests that the current production capabilities of the regional economy would lead
to $259.5 million in direct expenditures within the four-county Milwaukee
metropolitan area, and $157.6 million in direct expenditures in other regions,
representing a leakage of almost 38 percent from the original expenditure.
To put this leakage figure in some context, UWMCED used the RSRI input-output
model to estimate what would likely occur if the $417 million somehow were
magically dropped into the pockets of Milwaukeeans as increased household income.
Our calculation is that over two-thirds of the total initial expenditure would "leak" as
Milwaukeeans purchased goods and services from outside the region. As a result,
we estimate that in this "income hypothesis" about 4,000 jobs would be created,
the vast majority likely in low-paying, low value -added sectors such as personal
services and retail trade; thus, the,output and wage impacts would be much lower in
the income hypothesis than those we have estimated for the construction of LRT.
As compared to this income example, ' construction of an LRT system would involve
a higher volume of purchases of inputs from local producers. As a result, a much
higher proportion of the initial expenditures would remain inside the Milwaukee
region, thus generating significant economic benefits here.
Moreover, as we explore in greater detail in section IV of this report, there are
public policies that can further reduce the leakage in LRT expenditures, and hence
augment the economic impact of LRT in Milwaukee. If, for example, light rail
vehicles for the system were produced in Milwaukee instead of imported, UWMCED
calculates that the leakage of direct expenditures would be reduced to 26 percent of
total expenditures (meaning 74 percent of direct expenditures would remain in the
region), and estimated total job creation for the project would jump to 7,000. A long term advantage of such a local -production requirement would be, perhaps, the
development of a new local industry in the manufacture of light rail vehicles that
could produce thousands of permanent jobs in the region.
Tables 4,5,6 and 7 outline in more detail some of the dimensions of the
economic impact of construction expenditures for LRT in the Milwaukee region.
More detailed industry breakdowns of the impact of the proposed LRT system in
Milwaukee employment, output, and wages in the four county region is contained in
the appendix to this report.
Clearly, the main impact is in the construction sector, where over half the
projected jobs would be created during the building of the LRT system (accounting
for over 60 percent of the wages generated by LRT construction). Jobs in the
construction industry account for almost 80 percent of the directly created jobs in
the project. Indirect and induced job creation is chiefly in retail trade, services, and
FIRE (finance, insurance, and real -estate). In terms of occupational categories,
construction craftsmen and laborers represent over one -third of the total job creation
in the construction -phase of Milwaukee LRT, with substantial numbers of jobs
created for managers and administrators, machine operators, and clerical workers. In
short, many of the jobs that would be created by the construction of an LRT system
in Milwaukee are in well -paid occupations and sectors.
We underscore that these estimates are provisional, not definitive, and they should
be used carefully. Small shifts in assumptions in an input - output model -- for
example, if final route alignments result more or less money actually spent on
tunneling or right-of-way construction-- might make a big difference in which sectors
or occupational categories in the metro Milwaukee economy are most influenced by
building an LRT system. However, UWMCED offers these figures as a general guide
to the kinds of employment, output, and wage impact likely to be generated by LRT
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in this region. In that sensei we expect these data should be useful to policymakers
and the general public in the discussion of the economic merits of LRT in Milwaukee.

TABLE 4:
The Economic Impact of Light Rail Transit in Milwaukee
Estimated Employment, Output, and Wage Growth
in the Four County Region During System Construction
(Empl'oyment in jobs, not full-time equivalents)
(Dollar figures in thousands)

Sector

Employment

Output

Wages

Construction
Manufacturing
TPU *
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
FIRE **
Services
Government
Others

3086.2
578.2
211.1
218.9
768.5
261.8
821.8
70.8
23.6

190461.2
56014.0
19207.7
20153.7
20267.2
16299.9
38728.7
2320.5
1875.4

113550.1
17515.1
6553.7
6749.3
8985.8
5441.2
18201.5
1094.9
627.6

DIRECT EFFECTS
INDIRECT AND
INDUCED EFFECTS
TOTAL EFFECTS

3886.2

259452.4

138536.6

2154.3
6040.5

105876.0
365328.3

40182.6
178719.2

1.6

1.4

1.3

MULTIPLIERS

DIRECT EXPENDITURES WITHIN REGION
DIRECT EXPENDITURES OUTSIDE REGION
TOTAL INITIAL EXPENDITURE

* Transportation and Public Utilities
* * Finance, Insurance, Real Estate

Source: UWMCED estimates, using RSRI input-ouput model
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$259.4
157.6
417.0

TABLE 5:
Sectoral Distribution of Employment Effects of
Construction of Light Rail System in Milwaukee
Total LRT-related employment, by sector

Sector

Indirect
Induced

Direct

Total

Construction
Manufacturing
TUP
Wholesale Tra.de
Retail Trade
FIRE
Services
Others

3047
413
93
94
0
0
224
15

39
165
118
125
769
262
597
80

3086
578
233
219
769
262
821
95

All Sectors

3886

2155

. 6041

Percentage Distribution

Sector

Construction
Manufacturing
TUP
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
FIRE
Services
Others
All Sectors

Direct

Indirect
Induced

78.4
10.6
2.4
2.5
0.0
0.0
5.8
0.4

1.8
7.7
5.5
5.8
35.7
12.2
27.7
3.7

51.0
9.6
3.5
3 .5
12.8
4.3
13.6
1.6

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: Same as Table 4
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Total

TABLE 6:
Occupational Distribution of Employment Effects of
Construction of a Light Rail System in Milwaukee
Total LRT-related employment, by occupation

Occupation

Indirect
Induced

Direct

Total

ProfessionalfTechnical
Managers/Administrators
Sales Workers
Clerical Work~rs
Construction Crafts
Craftsmen/Kindred
Operatives
Laborers
Personal Services

292
447
38
327
1372
380
515
484
32

216
300
248
457
53
169
240
94
377

508
747
286
784
1425
549
755
578
409

All Occupations

3886

2155

6041

Percentage Distribution

Occupation

ProfessionalfTechnical
Managers/Adm inistrators
Sales Workers
Clerical Workers
Construction Crafts
Craftsmen/Kindred
Operatives
Laborers
Personal Services
All Occupations

Direct

Indirect
Induced

7.1
11.5
1.0
8.4
35.3
9.8
13.2
12.5
0.8

10.0
13.9
11.5
21.2
2.5
7.8
11 .1
4.4
17.4

8.4
12.4
4.7
13.0
23.6
9.1
12.5
9.6
6.7

100.0

100.0

100.0

Sources: Same as Table 4
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Total

TABLE 7:
Construction Generated Employment Impact Estimates
for Recently Built Light Rail Transit Systems

City

Milwaukee
Sacramento
St. Louis
Portland

Employment

Actual Capital
Costs in million
dollars

417.0 *
176.0
341.7 *
295.0 * *

6,041
2,000
5,188
10,605

Jobs per
per million
$ spent

14.48
11.36
15.18
35.95

* Estimates
* * Total for entire Banfield Transitway Project
of which $80 million was for highway

Sources: Milwaukee: UWMCED estimates, using RSRI mo~el; Sacramento: West, 1986; St.
Louis: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1987; and Portland: Strathman, 1983.

As Table 7 indicates, in the aggregate these estimated impacts for Milwaukee are
generally consistent with the forecasts made in other cities. The one exception is
Portland, where the estimated employment impact of construction of the Banfield
Transitway seems inflated, especially since an exceptionally high regional employment
multiplier of 4.47 was derived in the input-output model used there. Our estimates
produce a much more modest ---and, we think, more realistic-- employment multiplier
of 1.55 (compared to 2.0 in the St. Louis estimates and 2.6 in Sacramento).

Economic Impact of LRT: The Operations Phase
UWMCED has also estimated the potential impact on employment, output, and
wages in metropolitan Milwaukee of the operations and maintenance of a light rail
transit system. Based on the D.PW estimates of. $15.3 million in annual operations and
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maintenance expenditures, UWMCED estimates that this aspect of LRT would generate
in the four county region 624 jobs (508 direct in transit employment, 11 6 by indirect
and induced effects), $20.9 million in regional output, and $10.3 million in wages in
the region. This estimate is generally in the same range as the actual experience in
Portland and Sacramento, (when ac·counting for the higher level of projected
expenditures in Milwaukee), although our estimate is much lower than the projections
made for the St. Louis Metro Link. 3
Sacramento's RT Metro is staffed by 101 people, including light rail administration,
train operators and supervisors, vehicle and right of way maintenance, and fare
inspection (Matott, 1989, 10). Assuming a multiplier of 2.0, RT Metro would appear
to generate around 200 jobs in Sacramento, for a system somewhat smaller in scale
and more bare-bones than the one envisioned for Milwaukee.
Similarly, Portland's MAX system, also smaller than the LRT system sketched in
the 1991 transit corridor study in Milwaukee, employs 36 drivers and 46 maintenance
employees. Related administrative employment for LRT may raise total system-related
operations employment to near 100 --comparable to Sacramento (Tri-County
Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon, 1990).
Finally, the final environmental impact statement (EIS) for St. Louis' Metro Link
offers employment impact estimates for LRT operations far higher than UWMCED's for
Milwaukee. The St. Louis scenario envisions 2,089 direct jobs created by LRT, and,
with indirect and induced effects, total employment of 4,198 generated by Metro Link
operations (U.S. Department of Transportation et aI., 1987, 5-32).
In sum, operating and maintaining the proposed LRT system will probably create
around 625 jobs in metro Milwaukee, although this estimate may be slightly high when
viewed in comparison with the experiences of Sacramento's RT Metro and Portland's
MAX, or low when compared to the estimates for St. Louis' Metro Link.

Employment and Investment from Transit Corridor and
Station-Area Redevelopment
A final potential source of long-term employment and investment growth from LRT
will come from office, retail, residential, and industrial developments stimulated in
st.ation areas and along route alignments of the system.
We explore in Section III of this report the record of fixed rail investments in
promoting redevelopment in various cities. However, we were unable to discover any
studies offering precise or definitive estimates on the number of jobs or the level of
investment generated in transit-related development projects. Because precise route
alignments and station locations have not yet been determined for the proposed
Milwaukee LRT system, UWMCED could not make estimates regarding the potential
investment, real estate development, and job creation that might occur from stationarea redevelopment in specific Milwaukee-area neighborhoods. However, as we argue
in Section III, the evidence suggests that well-coordinated economic
development/transit planning can produce significant investment around fixed rail
systems. These investments, if not necessarily producing net new employment, can
nevertheless help rechannel regional development in a manner that may create
employment in corridors suffering from severe unemployment or underemployment.
The final environmental impact statement for St. Louis Metro Link project did
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produce estimates of job creation and capital investment around LRT station -area
development projects. These estimates are reproduced in Table 8 . These data should
be viewed cautiously; in our view, they represent extraordinarily roseate estimates of
the potential employment and investment impact of Metro Link-related development
projects. Nevertheless, we offer these estimates as guideposts for Milwaukeeans in
gauging the employment and investment-generating potential of redevelopment
projects around LRT routes and stations.

TA BLE 8:
Capital Investment and Employment Associated With
Economic Development At or Near LRT Stations:
Estimates for St . Louis' Metro Link

Type of Development

Capital Investment
(in millions $)

Employment
(perm. jobs)

Development contingent
on LRT

23.0

965

Near-term adjacent
development by LRT
authority

59.7

2,200

Long-term adjacent
development

102.5

4,130

Other possible walkaccess development

346.9

19,545

Total LRT-Related
development

532.1

26,840

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation et aI., 1987, 5-26, 5-27
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TABLE 9:
Summary of Estimated Employment, Output, and Wage
Effects of Light Rail Transit in Milwaukee
Estimated Employment, Output, and Wage Growth
in the Four County Region
(Employment in jobs, not full -time equivalents)
(Dollar figures in thousands)

Construction Phase (4-5 years)

Employment

Effect

Direct
Indirect/Induced
Total

Output

Wages

3886.2
2154.2
6040.5

259452.4
105876.0
365328.3

138536.6
40182.6
178719.2

524.0
149.5
673.5

15300.0
7717.4
23017.4

8232.4
3075.5
11398.9

Operations Phase

Direct
Indirect/Induced
Total Effects

Source: UWMCED calculations, from RSRI input-output model

Summary

As Table 9 summarizes, there are important benefits in increased regional
employment, output, and wages from the construction and operations of a light rail
transit system. Like any major public works project, there is an immediate economic
benefit from LRT: a pump-priming of the local economy that will result in short-term
job growth.
These short -term benefits are not insignificant: as the Socia l Development
Commission recently pointed out, the number of available jobs in Milwaukee is much

21

lower than the number of potential job seekers (i.e. officially unemployed, discouraged
workers, and the able -bodied on public assistance). The SOC's most recent estimate
pegged this gap at over 35,000 jobs (Social Development Commission, 1991,7).
Thus,. any job creation associated with LRT in Milwaukee, especially jobs with solid
wage levels, will be welcome.
In the long -term, LRT may offer structural benefits in improved productivity --and,
eventually, output, and employment.:- in the Milwaukee economy. Although there is no
solid evidence to "prove" that rail transit has such effects, there are good reasons to
believe that LRT, like public infrastructure investments generally, will improve the
return on private capital in the Milwaukee area.
Finally, as we examine in detail in Section IV of this report, if creative local
indu·strial policies are deployed to strategically use LRT expenditures in the
development or restructuring of local industries, the long -term employment, output,
and wage impacts of light rail in Milwaukee may be significantly enhanced.
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SECTION.III:

THE IM PACT OF FIXED RAIL TRANSIT ON
LAND USE AND NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPM ENT
Overview

Proponents of fixed rail transit systems argue that one of the long-term economic
benefits of such systems is that they promote efficient patterns of land use and
stimulate neighborhood development, investment, and employment along system
routes and around transit stations.
To provide some comparative perspective that might assist Milwaukeeans. in
assessing the potential redevelopment impact of a light rail system here, UWMCED has
closely examined the available evidence regarding the impact of fixed rail systems on
land use and neighborhood development in several cities. Unfortunately, there are few
systematic or conclusive IIbefore and after studies on the redevelopment effects of
transit inve·s tments. Nevertheless, from a growing literature of descriptive case
studies, we have been able to assemble sufficient information on the IItransitdevelopment connection II to draw at least some provisional conclusions regarding the
redevelopment potential of LRT investments.
ll

Although our main concern in Milwaukee is with the potential redevelopment impact
of light rail systems, UWMCED has also examined evidence on the investment and
development impacts of post- 1950 heavy rail systems in cities such as Atlanta,
Baltimore, Miami, San Francisco, and Toronto. We have examined these heavy rail
systems for two main reasons. First, although many of these subway and metrorail
systems are still relatively new, they nevertheless have been in existence longer than
the more recently constructed light r'ail systems in Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Portland, and
Sacramento. Thus, transit-related redevelopment effe'cts should be more discernible in
the heavy rail cities, particularly in cities such as Atlanta, San Francisco, Montreal, and
Toronto whose systems have been in operation for more than a decade. 4
Second, because of their typically higher levels of ridership and generally more
elaborate station structures, heavy rail systems represent the IIbest-case scenario" for
transit-induced redevelopment impacts. Put another way, if we do not find significant
redevelopment associated with heavy rail systems that have been operating for several
years, then, all things being equal, the likelihood is not particularly high that newer,
less elaborate light rail systems will ·stim~late substantial redevelopment activity. On
the other hand, although we cannot assume that the redevelopment impacts of heavy
rail systems would necessarily be repeated in cities with LRT, findings that
development activity has been stimulated by heavy rail would at least suggest
potentially positive impacts in cities such as Milwaukee considering an LRT
investment.
UWMCED's review of the transit-related redevelopment record in cities with fixed
rail systems of all types has produced three main findings :
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Fixed Rail Systems Have a Positive, But
Moderate Development Impact

Properly implemented and coordinated with other public and private investments,
fixed rail transit appears to stimulate some redevelopment and to have a moderate
influence in channeling urban land use into more efficient, compact patterns. As we
explore below, there is ample evidence of transit-related redevelopment in the cities we
examined, although the extensiveness of these redevelopment impacts varies
considerably from city to city. Investments in rail transit can make specific areas
attractive for development because they:
1. Increase the accessibility of
employment ce~ters;

~n

area to a region's population and

2. Provide concentrations of potential clientele for development through high daily
passenger traffic through station areas;
3. Permit high-density development by reducing parking requirements in the area;
4 . Demonstrate a long -term commitment to an area by making a substantial public
infrastructure capital investment in transit facilities (U.S . Department of
Transportation et aI., 1987, 5-32).
However, the redevelopment record of fixed rail systems should not be oversold.
The impacts typically are modest, and there appears to be substantial lag time for
developments to occur, as private investors need to gain confidence in transit areas as
viable markets. By itself, fixed rail transit is not a "quick fix" for urban redevelopment
or central city revitalization. As Robert L. Knight, who conducted a decade ago one of
the most systema~ic analyses of the impact of rail transit on urban land use,
concluded:
Available evidence does not show that recent
American and Canadian rail rapid transit Investments
have had major effects on urban structure, as
determined by activity locations, resulting patterns of
travel, and related secondary effects. Within our ability
to identify such effects, they simply do not seem to
have occurred within the ten to twenty year period we
have had to observe modern transit systems such as
San Francisco's BART, the Toronto subway, the
Montreal Metro, and the major new extensions of
older systems elsewhere. This seems to be the case
even under the best of circumstances, such as in
Toronto, in ,which the transit investment is fortuitously
coordinated with other forces such as an expanding
local economy, land available and attractive for
development around the transit stations, other nearby
public investments, zon ing incentives, and a
supportive community (Knight, 1982, 110).
Moreover, transit-re la ted redevelopment typically has represented a small
percentage of the overall development occurring even within metropolitan regions
containing fixed rail systems; thus, the ability of fixed rail to combat such phenomena
as suburban spraw l or the decentralization of employment should not be overstated.

24

Even the most elaborate and celebrated recent fixed rail systems --in cities such as
Atlanta, Montreal, Portland, San Francisco, Toronto, or Washington, D.C. where
ridership is generally considered strong and where there are visible signs of transitrelated redevelopment-- provide no support for the notion that implementing fixed rail
transit systems will fundamentally alter market trends or other forces promoting the
decentralization of population and employment. Table 10 provides at lea's t some
indication of how the deconcentration of population in metropolitan areas in Canada
and the United States has generally proceeded apace, even in cities that have
implemented rail transit systems. To again quote Robert L. Knight:
[T]he amount of development induced to
concentrate around rapid transit stations has been
only a very small f.raction of all new regional
development occurring in the decade or two following
construction of modern r'ail transit systems, and an
even smaller fraction of any region's total building
stock. This is true even for Toronto, where high rise
buildings around some stations have been widely cited
as evidence of transit's potential for shaping urban
development (Knight, 1982, 111).
Given this :overall record, UWMCED concludes that proponents of LRT, in Milwaukee
and elsewhere, would be ill-advised to "sell" such systems as antidotes to
suburbanization or as the linchpin of a trend back to the compact, denser patterns of
urban land use that existed earlier in the twentieth century. There can be important
development benefits from rail transit, but they should not be exaggerated.

Ridership is a crucial determinant of private sector
development interest near transit stations.

The attractiveness of areas around transit stations as sites for private
development is integrally linked to levels of system ridership. Well-used transit stations
bring together thousands of potential clients daily for any number of development
possibilities in the commercial, residential, office-work sectors. However, the volume
of passengers utilizing specific transit stations or transit centers must be impressive to
attract the interest of private investors (Cushman, 1987, 179-180), As we explore
below, there is much that the public sector can do to stimulate station - area
development, but the bottom line is that the chief market for such projects will be the
clientele of the transit system. Self-evidently, if few commuters are patronizing a
transit system, there would appear to be little incentive for private investors to develop
real-estate around under-utilized transit facilities, particularly retail activities that
require continuous and substantial "walk-up" clientele. Thus, ridership is not only a
transportation-planning issue; it is also important in assessing the economic
development potential of a given transit investment.
Unfortunately, there appear to be no universally accepted figures on the daily
ridership that would constitute a "minimum threshold to attract private commercial
interests who will find it beneficial to invest in areas in and around transit stations"
(Cushman, 1987, 180). King Cushman, the director of development and community
affairs for Pierce Transit in Tacoma estimates the development-attractiveness threshold
at around 100,000 daily riders (Cushman, 1987, 180). His figure may be somewhat
high, but clearly it suggests that LRT systems, which generally handle daily ridership in
range of 15,000 to 40,000 passengers, are likely to exert, at best, a modest stimulus
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on private sector redevelopment.

TABLE 10:
Recent Fixed Rail Investments and Suburban Sprawl
% of metropolitan area population living in selected
. central cities, 1970- 1990

1970

1980

1990

Atlanta
Baltimore
Buffalo
Miami
Pittsburgh
Portland
Sacramento
Washington, D. C.

29.4
43.3
41.6
26.4
22.1
41.3
30.3
24.9

19.9
35.8
35.3
21.3
19.1
33.3
25.1
19.6

13.5
30.9
33.8
18.5
18.0
35.2
24.9
15.5

Milwaukee

51.1

45.5

43.9

Montreal
Toronto

45.9
34.1

35.4
28.0

33.9
25.0

City

Sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1991, tables 36 and 40;
Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, various years

Coordinated public investments and station-area
planning are necessary to generate neighborhood
revitalization benefits from rail transit investments
There is, as King Cushman notes, nothing "certain or automatic" about
redevelopment around transit station sites (Cushman, 1987, 179). This is particularly
true in neighborhoods with relatively weak private investment markets, although, as
the Knight study in the 1970s showed, the evidence seems compelling that even in
robust private markets, extensive public development and land-use planning is essential
to maximize the "transit-development connection."
Fixed rail transit offers the opportunity for development, but, in itself, is not
sufficient to spur significant spin -off development around routes and stations. The
experience of other cities suggests that several supporting conditions are necessary to
derive economic development and land use benefits from rail transit: the availability of
land and relative ease in assembling it for development; generally favorable economic
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conditions; complementary public land use policies; and widespread community
support .
Particularly in the fragile economies of central city neighborhoods, the "field of
Dreams" approach to redevelopment -- "if we build a transit station, developers will
come" -- is not likely to work. This observation seems especially pertinent in the
context of light rail systems where, outside of downtown settings, LRT stations often
consist of nothing more elaborate than tracks .running next to a structure resembling an
extended bus shelter. By itself, such an unassuming physical structure, especially if
accompanied by modest levels of ridership, is unlikely to stimulate substantial spin-off
development.
In general, there are three types of government strategies regarding transit
investment and redevelopment:
.

1. Passive Development: A "field of dreams" strategy that essentially assumes
private markets.will automatically develop around transit investments. No special effort
is made by local government to guide, let alone control, private development around
stations;
2. Seed Development: Local government incentives --tax abatements, low-cost
loans or gap financing, zoning incentives-- that will encourage developers to invest
around station sites;
3. Active Development: Strategic, public intervention in the development
marketplace that coordinates transit planning and economic development initiatives.
Intervention of this type includes joint public -private development projects around
transit stations, as well as major public investments such as government offices,
cultural amenities, o.r substantial infrastructure improvements that would augment the
development prospects around rail stations (Witherspoon, 1982, 348).

Based on the experience of other communities, UWMCED concludes that if city
neighborhoods in Milwaukee are to fully benefit from a major public investment in light
rail, local government needs to pursue an active development strategy in stimulating
investment around the LRT stations and routes. In their important study of the
development impacts of "second generation" U.S. rail transit systems, Skinner and
Dean conclude:
[R]ail transit may be a necessary but insufficient
condition for encouraging efficient land use patterns
and economic development. Thus, the ultimate
success or failure of the second generation rail
systems . .. will depend on the nature and extent of
additional actions which are taken to complement the
rail system ... One of the lessons learned from earlier
experiences is that decisive and strong local actions
may be required to achieve even a modest shift in
established trends (Skinner and Dean, 1982, 273 274).
These observations are especially trenchant when applied to the potential impact of rail
transit on distressed, inner city economies . As we examine, the record of rail transit in
other cities in alleviating inner city economic distress has.been exceedingly modest.
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UWMCED concludes that decisive, complementary public policies are absolutely
essential if a light rail investment is to leverage private investment in the depressed
market of Milwaukee's Inner City.

Case Studies: The Fixed Rail Transit/Urban
Redevelopment Connection

In the following section, we present short, descriptive analyses of the land-use and
urban redevelopment impact of fixed rail transit systems in selected cities. These are
not offered as anything approaching .exhaustive or definitive impact studies of the fixed
rail experience in these cities. Although UWMCED researchers visited several of these
cities and observed their fixed rail systems, our analysis is based chiefly on the existing
literature on these cities (and thus is limited by the general lack of systematic "before
and after" studies of the development impact of rail transit systems). Our intent is to
review these cases to develop a general sense of how fixed rail systems have affected
land use and community development in various cities, to focus on lessons to be
learned and pitfalls to be avoided from the experiences of other cities.
Even without definitive impact studies, it is vital to bring at least some comparative
perspective to the analysis of important public investment decisions, to observe how
similar decisions have worked out in other communities. Too often, important public
decisions are made on the basis of local "feasibility studies" that are invariably based
on h-ighly judgmental assumptions that, at minimum, could benefit from " rea lity
testing from the experiences of comparable communities. For example, researchers
can develop plausible scenarios, based on internally consistent assumptions, regarding
the amount of development likely to occur around proposed rail routes in a given city,
and the amount of .employment likely to be generated by that development. At a
minimum, however, it would be useful to find out whether such levels of employment
or development have been generated in other cities, under what conditions, and
whether, in the context of experiences elsewhere, the seemingly reasonable
assumptions used to produce such estimates make sense.

a

II

In short, even lacking definitive impact studies, we do think that descriptive reviews
of the record of other cities might prove instructive to Milwaukee area residents and
policymakers as we consider the merits ·of a proposed light rail system for this region.
It is for that purpose that we offer the following case studies as illustrative of the state
of research knowledge about the d-evelopment/land use impact of fixed rail
investments in selected cities.

Heavy Rail City Case Studies

Atlanta

The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) began operations in
1979. MARTA is a 32 mile, 29 station heavy rail system whose construction cost to
date has been approximately $2.3 billion (about half funded by the federal
government). By the end of the 1980s, MARTA had a daily ridership of approximately
185,000 which, although substantially less than the 395,000 passengers projected by.
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MARTA's planners, has been steadily climbing in the 1980s. There is a general
perception among analysts that "Atlanta's rapid transit system is one of the major
[recent] success stories in urban transit" (Ryan, 1989, 18; Tefft, 1979, 45).
To perhaps an unprecedented deg"ree among U.S. cities, land use and urban
redevelopment issues were paramount in planning Atlanta's rapid rail system. In the
words of one study, MARTA was conceptualized as nothing less than "an urban
transportation system that will modify the Atlanta metropolitan area structure" (Potter,
1982, 353). Planners sought to use MARTA "to transform a number of key Atlanta
areas into healthier, more productive centers" (Potter, 1982,357). In addition,
Atlanta's Regional Commission (ARC) explicitly viewed MARTA as a transportation and
development policy that would produce benefits for the city through "value capture"
on transit-area development project~. "A central assumption of value capture policy,"
stated the ARC in 1978, "is that rapid transit systems such as MARTA should not be
viewed solely as transportation improvements" (Tefft, 1979, 46).
Specifically, there were three explicit development objectives associated with
MARTA:

(1) $tabilizing and revitalizing Atlanta's downtown business district;
(2) Encouraging commercial development around certain passenger
stations, creating nodes or employment centers that commuters could
reach easily without personal transportation;
(3) Slowing down suburban sprawl, and stimulating a larger
share of the region's future growth within the central city
(Potter, 1982, 353).
According to Paul E. Potter, MARTA's planners hoped that this restructuring would
occur in the following way:
When the new transit system is completed and
many Atlantans have changed their commuting habits,
the flow of commuter traffic to and from MARTA
stations will be heavy. Some people are expected to
seek residences closer to the transit stations, so that
station areas will become logical centers for some
types of commercial activity. Finally, the business
community will probably construct new office
buildings near some stations, creating new
employment centers at these locations. In these ways,
a number of the MARTA stations will become logical
nuclei for future urban development (Potter, 1982,
353) .
This scenario, of course, is what all rail system proponents hope for, but Atlanta's
planners did not passively wait for markets to develop around transit nodes. Rather,
the ARC and the City of Atlanta, supported by $1 million in Urban Mass Transit
Administration (UMTA) planning assistance, conducted detailed "Transit Station Area
Development Studies" (TSADS) to provide "not only a scenario for development at
each site, but deliberate public actions to produce such developments" (Potter, 1982,
353). MARTA stations were classified as to their develop"m ent potential and the type
of neighborhood environment desired in the station -area (high density commercial or
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offices, mixed use, residential, etc.). MARTA Special Public Interest Districts were
created around the stations to expedite changes in city zoning ordinances that would
allow higher-intensity "nodal development" around certain stations.
Through joint development, the leasing by MARTA of publicly-controlled "air rights"
to corporations or private developers at certain MARTA stations, and city infrastructure
expenditures around station sites, development has occurred at MARTA routes,
although not nearly at the level envisioned in the various plans of the late 19 60s and
early 1970s. "The opening of three MARTA stations in the Midtown area of Atlanta
helped make it a target for intensified development," writes Clarence Stone in his
1989 study of urban redevelopment in Atlanta (Stone, 1989, 18). King Cushman
observe .s that "companies now want to be near direct transit system access so
MARTA has been able to obtain a great deal of commercial space activity around a
number of its stations" (Cushman, 1987, 183). Georgia Pacific and IBM high -rise
offices are atop MARTA air rights, and 'there are now numerous structures --such as
the Georgia state office complex, Peachtree Summit building, and Southern Bell's
headquarters -- whose development is directly connected to MARTA. Some joint
development activity is beginning to generate "respectable" income for MARTA . Lease
income for 1987 was estimated at $700,000 in 1987, and long range projections by
MARTA peg annual income from joint development at a very optimistic $10 million
annually (Cushman, 1987, 183). It is clear that some important development benefit
val~e has been captured by MARTA, particularly around its downtown stations .
Nevertheless, there are critics regarding how efficaciously MARTA has been used in
Atlanta to maximize its development and redevelopment potential. Some analysts,
such as Leon S. Eplan, argue that "the handful of examples of transit -stimulated
benefits pale beside the opportunities lost, probably irrevocably. Especially in regard to
the ability of transit to help shape the urban area to become more efficient, more
satisfying and less wasteful --to direct land uses, jobs, public resources, and social
policies: few a t t e m p t s have been made which would utilize transit in this way,
although these types of benefits were among the earliest recognized as transit's
greatest potentialities" (Eplan, 1979, 138-139). Although certainly not conclusive in
this regard, the population data in Table 10 nevertheless suggest that MARTA has had
a negligible impact in reconcentrating metropolitan Atla·n ta's population in the central
city.
This limited regional impact is understandable in view of the refusal of Cobb and
Gwinnett counties --rapidly growing areas north of Atlanta -- to participate in MARTA, a
refusal that many observers attribute to racial politics. Gary Orfield and Carole
Ashkinaze argue that Atl~nta's suburban politicians sought to increase socio-economic
separation and maintain racial boundaries between the city and suburbs, and one way
was for northern suburbs to reject participation in MARTA (Orfield and Ashkinaze,
1991,53).
Eplan also maintains that, with the exception of a few examples, "most of the
substantial development now- adjacent to stations would probably have been
undertaken in these locations regardless of MARTA" (Eplan, 1979, 138) . This
conclusion was echoed by Andrew Hamer, an economist at Georgia State University,
who claimed that "the conventional wisdom is that there is not a heck of a lot
happening that wouldn't have happened without MARTA ... It has done a little real
estate rearrangement, but they can't show that it wouldn't have been done in the first
place" (Tefft, 1979,44-45). Given the concentration of MARTA-related development
downtown, where office and commercial development markets were strong nationally
throughout the 1980s in major cities with and without fixed rail systems, this criticism
appears plausible.
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Concomitantly, very little evidence has been presented that MARTA was used --in
tandem with other public powers -- to fundamentally revive Atlanta's distressed
neighborhoods, or, in any systematic , way, serve the economic needs of the city's
poor. Eplan criticizes Atlanta for failing to create a land assembly or development
agency that could coordinate station-area development; instead, he argues, developers
"continue to deal with MARTA on a one -on -one basis, which sometimes has been
successful, often not successful, but simply too limited a process to realize a wide
range of benefits" (Eplan, 1979, 139). The broader mixed-use and residential projects
originally planned around several MARTA stations have generally not been realized, in
part because many supportive public improvements such as libraries and community
centers were not built because of public fiscal pressures, and in part because the
private investment climate in these station-areas was insufficiently enticing (Cushman,
1987,185).
'
More seriously, critic Clarence Stone, a professor of political science at the
University of Maryland and the author of a prize-winning study of Atlanta's governance
between 1946- 1988, has characterized MARTA ,as a system that has promoted
downtown revitalization and the gentrification of certain neighborhoods, but has not
been used as a lever to revive Atlanta's economically distressed city neighborhoods.
As an example, he cites the lack of any coordinated "affordable housing" strategy in
conjunction ' with station-area planning in Midtown, the result being a gentrificationoriented redevelopment process .
Stone arg 'u es that, in its final form, MARTA was a system that fit the goals of
Atla 'n ta's downtown elite while providing elusive benefits for the city's black
community. The first MARTA proposal was defeated in a 1968 referendum . In order to
secure black community support in the 1971 MARTA referendum, promises were
made that major black residential areas and public housing projects would be served by
MARTA lines. Thi~ issue of th~ Proctor Creek spur took on enormous political
significance in the black community, especially as the line was continually delayed and,
in 1986, a proposal was even made to substitute a bus line for the MARTA spur. (The
bus proposal withdrawn under intense pressure but as of 1989, the Proctor Creek spur
remained un built). These limited benefits of MARTA for Atlanta's black community
have been exacerbated by the exclusion of Atlanta's northern suburbs from the
system, denying inner city residents efficient mass transit links between their
neighborhoods and the region's growing job markets. Although black contractors and
some black professionals did benefit from MARTA's affirmative action hiring and
minority business enterprise/purchasing provisions, on the whole, argues Stone,
MARTA was not planned or implemented in a manner that meaningfully benefited
Atlanta's black community.
Despite its reputation for a strong black middle class, like so many metropolitan
areas in the United States there are "two A tlantas": one prosperous,- primari Iy
suburban and white; the other, poor, predominantly black, and disproportionately
concentrated in the urban core. The problem is so serious that former President Jimmy
Carter's newest crusade is the "Atlanta project": a major public-private initiative to
solve the city's increasingly alarming problems in housing, education, and employment
(Smothers, 1992). MARTA certainly did not create the "two Atlantas," but there is
little evidence that this multi -billion dollar mass transit investment has been used as
creatively as it might have been to tackle the city's most vexing social and economic
problems.
Atlanta avoided the "Field of Dreams" approach to transit planning, and consciously
attempted to link transit and economic development planning. Yet, the evidence
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suggests that MARTA's potential as a tool of economic development in Atlanta has not
been fully realized .

Miami

Miami's Metrorail is a 21.5 mile, 20 station system that began operations in 1 ~85.
It cost approximately $1.3 billion to build. Although Metrorail planners forecast a daily
ridership of almost 240,000 passengers, the system currently carries approximately
35,000 passengers each weekday, well below the threshold of 100,000 daily riders
suggested by some' as necessary for transit-stimulated redevelopment (U .S .
Department of Transportation, 1990, xi).
The Miami system has the unenviable distinction of being characterized with nearunversality by mass transit analysts as an example of an unsuccessful system, from
both a transportation perspective (achieving satisfactory ridership levels, easing traffic
congestion etc.) as well as from a land use and economic development standpoint.
Miami did have a Station Area Design and Development (SADD) program, ostensibly
designed to insure that Metrorail fully realized its potential to influence "the future
development of the metropolitan area" (Dyer,Spillman, and Lambert, 1979, 147) .
Some station-area planning, with citizen involvement, was done.
Nevertheless, critics characterize Miami Metrorail as a "classic example of a
significant lack of comprehensive transit and land use planning" (Cushman, 1987, 31).
There are, apparently, still a considerable number of subsidized parking spaces
available downtown, thus limiting incentives for Metrorail ridership; low patronage of
the system, in turn, has severely limited its development impact. Moreover, there was
little consideration of using the system to shape land use or economic development by
explicitly including s,uch criteria in the design of system routes and station locations; in
that sense, station-area development planning was almost an after-thought, limited to
making the best of the development potential of areas where stations happened to be
located. As Anthony James Catanese has pointed out, Miami's mistake was that
planners were "far more concerned with using existin'g rail rights-of-way than with
trying to shape urban form. The priority there was to reduce costs by using rights-ofway already assembled by the railroad. Consequently, the rapid transit system is in the
wrong place ... and that is the major reason for the failure of rapid transit in Miami.
The system does not 'serve the needs of the elderly, the poor, and children --the major
markets." (Catanese, 1987, 191).
In short, the Miami case suggests that rail system planners need to closely consider
the trade-off between: 1) capital cost savings from use of existing rights-of-way versus
2) potential economic development benefits from locating transit lines and stations
where development should and, in some cases, needs to occur.

Baltimore

Baltimore's heavy rail system, the Metro, began operations in 1983. It is currently a
14 mile, 11 station system, running from the heart of downtown, through the city's
Northwest corridor, into suburban Baltimore County and the rapidly growing suburb of
Owings Mills . An additional 1.5 mile spur from downtown to the Johns Hopkins
University hospital in East Baltimore is currently under construction. Daily ridership on
the Metro is approximately 45,000, respectable compared to other cities and given the
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size of the system, but nonetheless substantially below the pre-construction forecasts
of 103,000 and markedly below the ridership levels generally believed to produce
significant transit-related development and redevelopment. The capital costs of the
system to date have been approximately $1.3 billion (U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1990, vi).
Baltimore's Metro represents a considerably scaled back version of the city's
original rapid rail plan, unveiled in 1965, which called for a 72 mile, six leg system
with spurs radiating in all four directions. Nevertheless, city planners viewed even the
diminished Metro as an important development tool, "a new element in the structure of
the city" that offered developers "a greater degree of access to more parcels of land"
(Hill, 1983,31). The Baltimore City Department of Planning, in conjunction with the
Maryland Mass Transit Administration did conduct studies of the development
possibilities around Metro's stations,' although the planning was not nearly as elaborate
as Atlanta's, nor was there substantial p'ublic participation in the process.
The city designated urban renewal areas around stations needing such plans to
encourage development, and incorporated plans for infrastructure improvements
around the stations in the city's capital improvement budget. In addition, the city
looked for opportunities to acquire land and package it for development. Said the city
planning director: "It was done around the Inner Harbor and Charles Center
areas, Why not do it around the transit stations?" Around several of
the stations in marginal market areas, the city received $10 million from UMTA' s
"Urban Initiatives" program to finance joint development projects involving land
acquisition and the development of commercial, retail, and residential parcels. The goal
was -not only to promote development in these weak-market areas, but also to
stimulate sufficient, revenue -producing development for the city to "value capture"
some of the benefits (Gunts, 1983, 41).
However, early studies suggest limited economic development impact of the Metro,
either along its lines or around its stations. The bulk of development near the Metro
has occurred downtown, and this development is undoubtedly more attributable to the
general downtown boom experienced by Baltimore in the 1980s rather than any
dramatic Metro impact. As one analyst put it, "with no cross-lines to link riders to
other sections of the city, developers don't see a payoff in the subway --yet. That may
change slightly [when the Hopkins spur is completed] but can never match the
development that occurs on larger systems" (Hill, 1985,45). This development
impact may also change with the opening of the 27 mile Central Light Rail Line (CLRL)
in 1992-93, effectively adding a North-South rail route to the Metro's East-West line,
but any transit-induced development impacts from the interaction of the CLRL and
Metro systems remains well in the future.
In 1987, Baltimore's Regional Planning Council conducted a limited" before and
after" study of Metro's impact in Baltimore's Northwest corridor. The studY7 although
clearly preliminary, concluded that no clear, systematic pattern of increased economic
or real estate development seems to have followed Metro in the Northwest Corridor
(Regional Planning Council, 1987).
This modest impact is not surprising. First, the study was done in 1987, before the
opening of Section B of the Metro, extending it to the suburban growth center of
Owings Mills. Impressionistic evidence suggests that the presence of Metro in the
Owings Mills corridor has at least somewhat influenced land use patterns in that area.
Second, although city planners were attentive to development possibilities around
transit stations in Baltimore City, they were not particularly aggressive in making the
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kinds of massive investments required to support station-area redevelopment. At least
three of Metro's stations were in the heart of West Baltimore's deeply impoverished
black neighborhoods, requiring a major, complementary program of neighborhood
reinvestment that the city was unable to finance as it pursued its ballyhooed Inner
Harbor, downtown renaissance. Although city officials may have hoped for subwaystimulated revitalization in these neighborhoods, the Baltimore case represents a clear
lesson regarding how much is required, beyond investment in transit and some urban
renewal activity, for rail systems to contribute to economic development in distressed
inner city neighborhoods.

San Francisco

San Francisco's Bay Area Rapid Transit System (BART) was built in the 1960s, and
heralded as this country's first "major regional rapid rail system in over fifty years.
BART opened in "197 2, providing 71 miles of service in the San Francisco Bay Area.
Although bedeviled by early problems with mechanical malfunctions and uncertain
commuter interest, BART has settled into a consistent daily ridership pattern of
approximately 200,000 passengers, clearly enough volume to attract some interest
from the private sector (Cushman, 1987, 183-184).
BART is also one of the few systems whose impact on economic development and
land use has been systematically studied. Studies have been conducted by the
Department of Transportation, the BART Impact Studies project at the University of
California, Berkeley, and several private consultants and academic researchers
(Altshuler, 1979, 398-402).
On the whole, these analyses reveal surprisingly little evidence of major impacts on
regional land use or economic revitalization resulting from BART. San Francisco's
downtown boom coincided with BART's construction, and there has been considerable
development involving BART stations in downtown San Francisco. Some" of these are
joint development projects that have produced revenue for BART, and some leasing
arrangements may generate a consistent income stream "for BART.
However, researchers discount BART as a major cause of the downtown boom,
pointing out that San Francisco's CBD was growing rapidly prior to BART's
construction and that proponents of BART argued that it was necessary to
accommodate forecasts of major downtown office employment growth rather than
generate such growth. As a headquarters gateway to growing trade with the Pacific
Rim, downtown San Francisco was an attractive location for corporate offices and
redevelopment activity, whether serviced by BART or some other form of mass transit.
There is no evidence that BART stimulated downtown growth at any faster rate than
market forces were pushing such development; at best, BART can be sajd to have
been one of many factors fueling San Francisco's downtown redevelopment in the
1960s and 1970s.
Even as downtown San Francisco boomed, however, there was no evidence that
BART helped reconcentrate metropolitan area population and employment in the
central city. The city has continued to decline as an employment center in the Bay
Area region, and there is little evidence of an employment surge in the BART corridor
(compared with other areas in the region). Moreover, even on a regional basis,
between 1965 - 1975 the BART counties experienced a 13 percent growth in
employment, compared with 49 percent growth in the remainder of the region. Even
on the criterion of office construction and building rehabilitation, Dyett and Escudero
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found:
According to building permit data, neither San
Francisco nor Oakland have increased their share of
regional office construction during any portion of the
BART period . Informants identified four office
buildings which might have located in a different part
of the Bay Area except for BART, but none were in
San Francisco (Altshuler, 1979, 399).
Although BART has failed to staunch the dispersed pattern of land use that exists
in the Bay Area, it does appear to have promoted clustered development along the
BART corridor in downtown San Francisco. According to Dyett and Escudero, " San
Francisco's business district has experienced a definite redirection of office building to
Market Street (location of the BART line) and the south of Market area" (Altshuler,
1979, 400; Hartman, 1984). This result confirms the notion that rail transit can help
rechannel development activity in strong market settings, especially downtQwn
settings where high-density already is the norm.
However, outside of downtown San Francisco, the clustering impact of BART has
been minuscule. As Melvin M . Webber reports:
Most suburban stations stand in virtual isolation
from urban development activity in their subregions,
seemingly ignored by all except commuters who park
their cars in BART's extensive lots . A few apartment
buildings have been built within one -mile radii of a
few stations ... [and] two modest -sized office
buildings were erected, in Berkeley and Walnut Creek,
close to the stations ... In general, however, the
transit stations have not attracted higher density
suburban developments (Altshuler, 1979,401).
In sum, as noted transportation scholar Alan A. Altshuler concludes, "the San
Francisco experience provides no support for those who would use rapid transit as a
primary technique for the 'revitalization' of core areas that are currently stagnant or
declining" (Altshuler, 1979, 400). In a growth area, like San Francisco's downtowo,
new development may cluster around downtown stations, but that is very different
than claiming such development was caused by the rail system, or asserting much
regional economic benefit from such station-area concentrations. Little clustered
development appears to have occurred at outlying stations in the Bay Area, limiting
any land-use efficiencies attributable to the system, and mitigating the effectiveness of
BART in transporting inner city residents to the centers of employment growth
increasingly dispersed throughout the region.
Even more serious criticisms concerning BART's social and economic impact have
been leveled by sociologist J. Allen Whitt and urban planner Chester Hartman. In his
award -winning book on BART, Urban Elites and Mass Transportation, Whitt conciudes:
BART will not challenge the dominance of the
private automobile, for it was not designed to do so.
BART will not increase the mobility of the poor and
thus help to redistribute life chances, for it was not
designed to do so. BART was the creation of the
large businesses in downtown San Francisco, and the
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principal aim of these businesses ... was to promote
urban development in predictable and profitable ways
and to defend property values in the central business
district (Whitt, 1982, 76).
"BART, II claims Whitt, II was designed to serve ... the preservation and growth of
the central city and the protection of corporate investments there." In addition, BART
appears to have merely II re distributed growth instead of generating new growth," in
turn setting off a "speculative environment in the land market of the region, II rather
than promoting a rational, efficient metropolitan land-use strategy (Whitt, 1982, 71).
As to which segments of the Bay Area population benefited the most from BART,
Whitt quotes a Berkeley geographe.r who characterized BART as an expensive, IIhigh
class commuting system for ... that minute fraction of the population that were
in ... administrative and fiscal activities in downtown San Francisco.
It didn't
provide useful transportation in minor parts of the city. II (Whitt, 1982, 74).
Despite the assurances of BART officials that the system would serve low-income '
residents, BART does not go near the largest black neighborhood in San Francisco,
Hunter's Point. In fact, within San Francisco BART has only four stations outside
downtown and does not serve vast areas of the city, including most of its lower income population (Hartman, 1984, 6). "The function of BART," flatly states Chester
Hartman, lIis to bring suburban workers from Contra Costa, Alameda, and San Mateo
counties into the downtown center ll (Hartman, 1984, 6). As Martin Wohl argues:
Downtown is increasingly becoming the headquarters
for the more prosperous workers, and it seems that
BART was especially designed to serve these
workers, not the poor who probably need it the most,
and not the masses who represent the bulk of San
Francisco and Oakland's population II (Whitt, 1982,
75).
Certainly, the system' s IIradial'~ and opposed to IIcross-haulll route alignment,
marked by long -distance, high -speed runs instead of neighborhood-oriented, lI ur ban style ll transit routing, favored more prosperous outlying communities rather than city
neighborhoods outside of downtown. Thus, while BART avoids Hunter's Point, there
are stations in the ·small, upper-middle income suburban communities of Lafayette and
Orinda.
Whitt, Hartman and other BART critics argue that, in part, the system failed to
serve the interests of the Bay Area's lower- and moderate -income communities
because there was insufficient public control over BART planning and implementation.
liThe decision of the BART board to allow private firms to manage the system, II writes
Whitt, lI also extended the influence of members of such business groups as the Bay
Area Council directly into the 'nuts and bolts' of BART's design and construction"
(Whitt, 1982, 78).
In short, the extensive studies of BART reveal significant questions regarding the
land use and community development impacts of the system. Although some
development has clearly spun-off, particularly around BART's downtown stations, it is
unclear how much is attributable to BART. Moreover, there is little evidence that
BART was used to rationally restructure metropolitan land use and employment
locations in the Bay Area in ways that would bolster access of low -income city
residents to suburban jobs or provide a stimulus to inner city economic development.

36

Nor is there much evidence that BA RT has provided much of an impetus to urban
redevelopment anywhere, except perhaps in downtown San Francisco. Critics maintain
that BART's planning was elitist and lacked the broad, public participation that might
have resulted in a transit-based development plan promising more salutary urban
redevelopment impacts and greater benefits to San Francisco neighborhoods.

Toronto
"It is generally agreed in the transit industry," begins a recent report, "that Toronto
has one of the finest examples of mass transportation on the North American
continent" (Young, 1980, 6) . Toronto's 35 mile subway system, the first leg of which
was constructed in 1954, carries a 'daily ridership of 720,000. Streetcar lines operate
throughout the metro area, and there are light rail spurs connecting the subway to
such suburban "nodal centers" as Scarborough in Toronto's rapidly expanding
metropolitan region . All told, there are 72.8 miles of LRT route in Toronto, with an
estimated daily ridership of 200,000 (Cervero, 1984, 135). This combination of
system types probably gives Toronto the most flexible fixed rail transit system in North
America, and undoubtedly explains why mass transit in Toronto attracts sufficient
ridership to defray 70 percent of its operating expenses from farebox revenues (Pill,
1987, 58). :
In addition, among recent fixed rail systems in North America, Toronto's is almost
universally considered the best example of integrated transit and development
planning. Zoning incentives and other development policies by Toronto's metropolitan
government since the 1950s were coordinated with transit planning, for example, to
concentrate high -density office employment areas at subway locations, and to
encourage apartment development at station-areas and suburban nodes accessible to
the subway by efficient bus routes (Bower, 1979, 23). At many stations, larger sites
than actually neede'd "were acquired to allow for maximum use of joint development
and cluster growth opportunities" (Stokes, 1979, 210). Joint development and "value
capture" policies have been implemented so that, for example, private developers and
property owners pay substantial sums for the right of direct connections to the
Toronto subway; this value capture also helps offset the system's operating expenses.
Evidence suggests that these policies have borne fruit: unlike U.S. rail transit,
where minimal transit-connected redevelopment has occurred outside of downtown
locations, intensive high-rise apartment and mixed -use development occurred at many
outlying stations in metro Toronto (Knight, 1982, 111). As one summary of the
Toronto experience put it:
Between 1959-1969, 90 percent of all office
construction occurred in the planning districts through
which the initial subway segment ran. Additionally,
almost 50 percent of all high - rise apartment
development also occurred in those areas. Through
today, the subway's influence on growth has
persisted. Major urban complexes continue to be
built downtown, many of them linked to rail transit.
Eaton Centre ... connects to two major downtown
stations. Toronto's subway has also led to the
construction of a maze of underground concourses
and tunnels, which provides an almost weather-proof
downtown that further enhances the central city.
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Farther out, apartment and commercial centers
cluster around stations (Stokes, 1979, 210 ).
This transit-related development did not occur overnight; for example, at the
intersection of the two major subways --the Yonge Line (opened in 1954) and the
Bloor-Danforth Line (opened in 1966)-- it took about 20 years for significant
development to occur. Even today, only two of the four corners have been developed
to high intensity (Pill, 1987, 59). The Toronto ·experience reinforces the conclusion
that planners must be patient in nurturing transit-related development impacts.
There are some claims that the subway caused development in Toronto,
particularly along the rapidly growing Yonge Street route, but these assertions appear
highly exaggerated (Altshuler, 1979, 397 ). Careful research indicates that "the subway
construction cannot be said. to hav·e created growth or economic activity of itself,"
(Bower, 1979, 22) ' and, while some stud ies have shown that property values did
increase more rapidly along subway routes than elsewhere in the city of Toronto,
"none have shown that the line attracted any development to the city --let alone to the
. region -- that would not otherwise have occurred there" (Altshuler, 1979, 397 ).
.
Clearly, however, the subway significantly influenced the patterns of growth in the
Toronto region. Implemented during a period of dramatic economic and population
growth in Toronto (the population of metro Toronto has tripled since the 1950s), "the
subway system was the key factor in ensuring that the new development strengthened
and enriched the central area and selected nodes on the subway corridors" (Bowers,
1979,22).
On balance, Toronto represents perhaps the best case of transit/development
planning, but while there is much to emulate from the Toronto experience, its
relevance to urban settings such as Milwaukee may be limited. Mass transit
investments coincided with the beginning of Toronto's major economic and
demographic growth spurt; thus, with a still-compact central city and minimal
decentralization of population and industry, rail transit could shape development
patterns rather than accomplish the · much more difficult task of reshaping already
established patterns of sprawl. In addition, transit development in Toronto was
facilitated by strong community support, historical traditions of mass transit patronage
combined with an already sound transit system, and a readiness to use public policy to
intervene in local real-estate markets for comprehensive land-use planning --all factors
generally absent from U.S. metropolitan settings. The establishment of metropolitan
government helped coordinate transit investments with development plans throughout
the Toronto region, so that suburban locations developed around nodes, and these
clusters were linked by public transportation to the city center. The policies of various
levels of government in the Toronto region led to orderly and relatively compact urban
expansion at reasonable densities. Again, this kind of metropolitan political integration
is very difficult to achieve in Armerican cities.
Finally, as its transit system. was under development, Toronto did not face the
problems of inner city disinvestment and employment contraction that must be
paramount concerns in rail transit planning in Milwaukee. The transit-related
development po~sibilities are very different in a region experiencing rapid growth, with
healthy expansion in the central city and very little inner city poverty, compared to a
slow ly growing region such as Milwaukee's, with a static central city, and significant
inner city poverty and unemployment.
However, in sum, Toronto's experience does illustrate the positive land use and
development returns that can be derived from transit investments when supported by
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well -designed public policies.

Light Rail Systems

Buffalo

"Perhaps no city," writes historian Jon Teaford, "placed greater faith in the miracleworking propensities of rail transit than did Buffalo" (Teaford, 1990, 300). From the
early 1970s, local advocates of rail transit in Buffalo "envisioned it as the stimulus for
a resurgent city" (Teaford, 1990, 301).
However, perhaps no city has had as disappointing an experience with the
contribution of light rail to urban redevelopment as Buffalo. In the early 1970s, the
Buffalo rail project was planned as an ambitious regional system that would link
downtown Buffalo to the expanding northern suburb of Amherst, presumably
connecting two major activity centers: downtown and the new SUNY Buffalo campus.
However, cost-overruns, planning snafus, and construction delays forced a paring back
of the system to a light rail line running 6.4 miles up and down Main Street. Completed
over 15 years after the initial planning began, the light rail line falls 6 miles short of
Amherst, its· original terminus, does not even reach the new SUNY campus and is, in
the eyes of some cynics, a "line that leads nowhere." Moreover, with suburban sprawl
proceeding rapidly in the 1970s, in the words of one critic, "a rapid transit system for
Buffalo had lost its rationale long before construction was ever begun" (Goldman,
1990, 237). By the time the light rail system was completed in 1985, the suburbs in
general and Amherst in particular were the true business centers of metropolitan
Buffalo; thus, rail transit could hardly playa major role in reviving either downtown
Buffalo or the rest of the central city.
The construction ·of the light rail line, begun in 1979 and completed in 1985, was a
fiasco. As Mark Goldman points out,
Construction of the line proceeded apace for "m ore
than six years and Main Street was inaccessible to
pedestrian and vehicular traffic for the bulk of that
time. When the system finally opened, Main Street's
retail core, whose revitalization was the primary
purpose of the project, had been all but destroyed by
the long, forced hibernation. The central business
district the new subway was supposed to save.
was gone (Goldman, 1990, 237).
Confronted by budget woes as Buffalo's economy suffered through
deindustrialization, the continued outflow of activity to the suburbs, and the
devastating recession of 1981 -82, transit officials were forced to delay completion of
the downtown pedestrian mall that was expected to be the capstone of their transitdevelopment "plan" (Teaford, 1990, 300). In that sense, as one report put it, "the
subway was opened before it was finished" (Desmond, 1986, 28). In a memorable
characterization, the executive director of the Buffalo's Niagara Frontier Transportation
Authority called downtown Buffalo "Beirut" because of continuing pedestrian mall
construction while trains ran through it (Desmond, 1986, 28).
Its redevelopment potential squandered by poor planning and a rapidly deteriorating
local economy, Buffalo's light rail system also experienced almost immediate financial
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difficulties. Daily ridership in 1988 was 29,500, a respectable total compared to other
light rail systems (see Table 1 above), but substantially below the pre-construction
forecasts ranging from 45,000 to 90,000 (Teaford, 1990, 300; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1990, vi). The New York Times reported in 1986 that "Buffalo's yearold rapid transit line might be forced to shut down unless a new source of revenue is
found ~o cover its operating deficits" (Teaford, 1990, 300). In 1992, NAFTA continued
to face daunting fiscal problems and the ever-present specter of system shut-down.
Not all reports on Buffalo's LRT are entirely negative. Lyndon Henry summarizes
several transportation publication reports asserting that" LRT has been directly
associated with downtown revitalization; over $200 million in private downtown
construction was committed during the first year of construction; adjacent downtown
office space is expected to increase by one-third; over $100 million in private
development has occurred near one station alone; an extensive Theater District boom
is associated with the new LRT" (Henry, 1989, 174). However, downtown
redevelopment occurred in numerous cities in the 1980s without fixed rail systems
(such as Milwaukee, for example). No evidence has been presented that this
downtown construction was directly stimulated by Buffalo's light rail investment.
Moreover, compared to other cities, Buffalo's downtown revitalization in the 1980s
was quite modest.
Numerous factors contributed to the unrealized promise of Buffalo's fixed rail
system, now labeled a "whit~ elephant" by considerable numbers of Buffalo-area
residents. Unrealistic, haphazard planning, inadequate community mobilization, and
disastrous overall economic conditions contributed to the difficulties. According to
Goldman, Buffalo's policy-makers treated the $500 million in federal funds provided for
the system as a "windfall" to be· spent, rather than as an opportunity to creatively and
comprehensively plan a transit-led economic development strategy. "As long as
someone else was paying," writes Goldman, "there was no reason, it seemed, not to
.build the subway" (Goldman, 1990, 238). As State University of New York-Buffalo
political scientist David C. Perry has written, Buffalo suffered from a general lack of
c rea t ive pub Ii can d pr ivat e sec t.o r Ie ader ship inth e 1 9 70s, and t his Ie ad er s hip
"vacuum" manifested itself not only in poor transit planning, but in the overall lack of
innovative "urban regeneration" strategies for the city (Perry, 1991, 258-277).
There is also little sign that Buffalo's leaders thought much about how the new rail
system might contribute to alleviating inner city problems. During the 1970s, as
100,000 whites left Buffalo for the suburbs, the city's black community grew to
almost 30% of the central city population and, with a declining local economy, inner
city Buffalo became an area of severe socio-economic distress. The Buffalo light rail
line has not played any discernible role in alleviating these conditions.
In sum, Buffalo appears to be a classic example of the perils of "Field of Dreams"
transit planning. Little connection was made between transit investments _and wider
community needs. Facing a new global economic realities, wrenching regional decline,
and growing inner city di'stress, more than building a short single-line, 14 station light
rail route was required to produce significant land use or economic development
impacts.

Portland

Portland's light rail system is a 15 mile, 29 station line known as the Metropolitan
Area Express, or MAX. Running between downtown Portland and the eastern suburb
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of Gresham, MAX was the centerpiece of the Banfield Transitway Project --a joint
highway-transit project that included LRT and reconstruction of portions of the Banfield
Freeway-- that was under construction between 1982 and 1986. The light rail
component cost $214 million, 83% of which was financed by the federal government.
Ridership on MAX has been solid and growing, with recent figures on daily
passengers over 24,000. Although this ridership is much lower than the projection of
42,000 daily passengers made in the 1970s, Tri-Met, the transit authority that runs
MAX, points out that the economic assumptions on which the 1970s forecasts were
based have also changed . In short, although ridership on MAX is not spectacular --it
is, for example, less than on Buffalo's line, which is not considered a major LRT
success story-- it nevertheless is a system with slowly growing patronage and the
promise of ridership growth.
There has been' much publicity in the transit industry about LRT "reshaping"
Portland (Middleton, 1990, LR2). G.B. Arrington, Jr., director of the public services
division of Tri-Met, makes the following analysis:
Portland is demonstrating that light rail can be
linked with land use and development planning to
have a dramatic effect on shaping regional
growth ... The impact of the line is being felt from
end to end ... [although] development activity is
greatest in the downtown and Lloyd Center ...
Based on the Portland experience, it's clear that
light rail may have a greater development impact than
heavy rail --certainly on a dollar-for-dollar basis ...
Light rail penetrates the community and is not
separated from it like heavy rail ... [and] is part of
the urban experience --an amenity, a signature for the
area. You can put light rail right into the middle of the
action (Arrington, 1989).
Arrington cites 44 projects worth over $690 million, immediately adjacent to MAX
that are either under construction or have been completed since the decision to
construct MAX in 1979. Another $440 million worth of projects along the MAX line
are on the drawing boards. In Arrington's analysis, four key factors have enabled local
governments to fruitfully coordinate transit and land use planning in Portland:
1. Downtown Planning. Beginning with its 1973 Downtown Plan, mass transit has
been at the heart of Portland's downtown redevelopment plans. Indeed, the detailed
1973 plan, which established clearly defined development corridors in and around
downtown, explicitly called for promotion of "a mass transit system that will carry
7 5 % of the passenger trips to and through the core; and which provides the viable
alternative to the private 'vehicle" (City of Portland, 1989, 13).
The construction of a five -block transit mall in the late 1970s (Dueker, Pendleton,
and Luder, 1982) helped anchor mass transit/land use planning downtown, and recent
planning documents --such as the Central City Plan adopted in 1988-- continue to
emphasize transit in redeveloping downtown Portland and its periphery. Transit
corridors are viewed as the "spine for future growth," where high-intensity
development is planned. The 1989 Downtown Portland Light Rail Alignment Study
declares that "the backbone of [metropolitan Portland's] transportation system will be
a regional light rail system . Downtown Portland, as the hub of the rail system, will
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need light rail to operate quickly, provide convenient access to many destinations, and
be developed as a total integrated system if it is to meet these challenges" (City of
Portland, 1989, 1). The document called for consideration of an underground
component for future additions to MAX downtown.
2 . Limits on Downtown Parking. Since the early 1970s, the City of Portland has
severely limited the availability of parking spaces downtown -- unlike Miami, for
example, whose easy downtown parking policies effectively undermined potential
ridership for the Metrorail. As Arrington points out, a "partial effect of the lid is to
automatically create a market for transit. [Thus], while the downtown has grown by
over 30,000 jobs since the 1970s, the number of cars entering the downtown has
stayed the same" (Arrington, 1989, n.p.).
3 . Tra nsit Station Area Planning Program. Portland established a $1.2 million
planning program to develop comprehensive land -use plans around LRT stations .
Extensive public consultation was conducted, with an active "Citizen Advisory
Committee" helping define local concerns and identify development priorities. Meetings
with neighborhood groups and local merchant associations were an ongoing proce'ss
during the construction phase of the project (Post, 1987, 70). Market analyses around
station - areas wer~ conducted and rezoning plans, contoured to light rail, were
implemented (City of Portland, 1983).
4. Balanced Transportation System. Since the early 1970s, beginning with the
transit - oriented leadership of Mayor Neal Goldschmidt, Portland has consciously
pursued "transit-friendly" transportation planning. Wherever possible, highway
expansion projects have been shelved in favor of mass transit; in fact, conversion of
funds originally earmarked for highways was the chief source of financing the LRT
system. A pro - transit "culture" has therefore begun to develop in Portland
--notwithstanding some of the early opposition to LRT, particularly in the suburb of
Gresham -- and this public support for transit augurs well for future positive linkages
between transit investments and land use planning.

There is little question that light rail has become an important infrastructure
investment in Portland in shaping and accommodating growth, and there is much,
particularly in Portland's integrated planning process, that Milwaukee and other cities
contemplating LRT would do well to emulate. However, the claims made by Arrington
and others concerning the development impact of MAX should not be taken too
literally. Certainly, for example, Arrington's claim regarding the development potential
of LRT versus heavy rail is unsupported. As Robert Cervero has pointed out:
Since light rail transit generally has poorer
performance characteristics (e.g. in terms of speed,
regional access, etc.) than heavy rail, its urban
development potential also could be expected to be
I e s s . W h 'e rea she a v y raj I t ran sit's 's p her e 0 f
influence' might encompass a radius of 2,000 feet
(three or four city blocks) or more, light rail transit's
seems to be somewhat less, perhaps one or two city
blocks at most. That, of course, is simply because the
lower performance of light rail means fewer land
parcels can turn gains in accessibility into higher land
values (Cervero, 1984, 134).
On the whole, the long -run prospects for joint development at several LRT stations
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in Portland seem promising, given the city's strong commitment to growth
management and extensive public land use planning. However, the results to date are
decidedly more modest than Arrington claims . The bulk of development adjacent to
MAX has occurred in and around downtown Portland, and is difficult to directly
attribute to MAX; certainly, downtown investment picked up in virtually all major cities
in the 1980s, including cities such as Milwaukee without any fixed rail system. In
addition, consistent with the record of other fixed rail cities, transit -related devel opment outside the central business -district in Portland has been rather modest.
Portland's planners clearly view LRT as the linchpin of a reshaping of metropolitan
land use and a revaluing of downtown as the regional economic hub, and are pushing
for extensions of MAX to help accomplish that goal. Table 10 does suggest tha.t, at
least in terms of population, the City of Portland may have been stabilized, after a
decade of decline, as the regional center in the 1980s: It is impossible at this stage to
determine how much of this population shift is attributable to LRT --either directly or
perhaps as a broad public symbol of renewed commitment to the central city.

TABLE 11:
Office Construction in Portland, 1970- 1991
% of metropolitan area office space in central city,
by period of office construction

Period

Percentage

Pre-1970
1970-1979
1980-1985
1986-1988
1989-1991

89.0
41 :5
43.6
36.5

Total (all Portland
office space)

52.7

16.7

Source: 1990 Portland Metropolitan Office Guide

However, as Table 11 suggests, the evidence is not particularly persuasive that
LRT has consolidated the position of Portland's central city as a regional economic
hub. The central city proportion of metropolitan area office space, a good barometer
of economic vitality in an economy increasingly based on services, has declined
dramatically in Portland since the early 1970s. 89.0 percent of the office space built
in metropolitan Portland before 1970 is located in the central city. By contrast, even
between 1989-91, well into MAX's operations and almost 20 years after the adoption
of Portland's downtown plan, only 36.5 percent of office space constructed in
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metropolitan Portland during this period was built in the central city. This hardly
bespeaks a transit -induced reconcentration of economic activity in the region.
Similarly, although some have claimed that transit investments boosted the downtown
share of regional retail sales from "7 % to 30 % in a dozen years," (Baldwin, 1987, 76),
census data reveals a more modest increase in the CBD portion of metropolitan area
retail sales from 4.0 percent in 1977 to 4.3 percent in 1982 (the most recent CBD
retail sales census data available). By way of comparison, Milwaukee's CBD held 3.8
percent of metro area retail sales in 1977, and declined to 3.1 percent in 1982. Other
cities of similar size --such as Baltimore, Cincinnati, Minneapolis, and Pittsburgh -experienced declines comparable to that of Milwaukee.
To summarize, Portland's experience with light rail, while not as roseate as some of
its publicists might argue, is nevertheless a good, solid example of U.S. urban
transit/development planning. Clearly, unlike some other cases of transit "planning,"
the LRT system was not developed in 'an ad hoc or isolated fashion; rather, it was
consciously planned as a central element in Portland's economic development and
land -use strategies. Nor was LRT developed with a "Field of Dreams" mental.i ty:
complementary public policies were implemented to draw out the potential economic
and land-use benefits of mass transit investments.
There has been some development associated with light rail, but these benefits,
emerging just a few years after the completion of the MAX system, should not be
oversold. Li -g ht rail has not restructured metropolitan Portland or reversed the
decentralization tendencies in the regional economy. Nor is there any direct evidence
that MAX caused significant development to occur that would not otherwise have
happened. MAX does appear to have contributed to a revaluation of downtown that
has been underway in Portland since the 1970s, but Portland-'s downtown renaissance
owes at least as much to market trends and other supportive public policies as it does
to mass transit investments.
Nevertheless, on the whole, the land -use effects of MAX to date appear to be
modestly positive and, given greater Portland's commitment to aggressively orient land
use planning around transit investments in the future, the potentially positive
development effects are likely to grow. Milwaukee could do much worse than follow
the scenario unfolding around light rail in Portland.

Systems Under Construction: Baltimore and St. Louis

Baltimore is preparing, in May 1992, to formally open the next leg of its regional
rail transit system: what eventually will be a 25 mile, 30 station "Central Light Rail
Line" (CLRL). Built at the cost of $446.3 million, the CLRL will run North-South, from
the rapidly growing northern Baltimore County suburbs of Hunt Valley and Timonium,
through Baltimore's extensively redeveloped central business district, eventually to its
southern terminus at Baltimore -Washington International Airport (BWI). Transit
planners are projecting a daily ridership of 33,000 passengers, which seems a modest
and appropriate figure when placed in the context of Baltimore's transit history (with
the heavy rail Metro) and the light rail ridership figures in other cities (State of
Maryland, 1991).
The CLRL is notable for the speed with which it was planned and built: five years
from initial environmental impact and alternatives studies to the first run of light rail
vehicles from Timonium to downtown Baltimore. This speedy implementation owes
much to the legendary leadership of Maryland Governor William Donald Schaefer,
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whose maxim when spearheading Baltimore's Inner Harbor revitalization as that city's
dynamic mayor was: "Do it now." Schaefer's commitment to the CLRL concept
generated entirely local funding for the project, which immeasurably accelerated the
pace of system development.
The advantage of this rapid implementation pace, of course, was efficiency, limited
disruption to city life, and minimized cost-overruns due to delays. This smooth
process in Baltimore has been dramatically different than the major cost-overruns and
disruption to business downtown experienced, say, in Buffalo.
I

The downside of Baltimore's speedy process is that little systematic planning or
public consultation was done to maximize the potential economic development and
neighborhood revitalization contribution of the CLRL. By way of contrast, Portland's
MAX involved a ten year planninglimplementation period which, although partially
slowed by the pace of federal decision-making, was also slowed by the deliberate pace
of local decisions and consultations on the project. However, as John R. Post
maintains, this was "regarded ' as time well spent in making a milestone community
decision" (Post, 1987, 67).
Thus, unlike in Portland, Baltimore did not produce detailed station-area
development plans for CLRL, nor is there any blueprint for a set of complementary
public policies to reinforce or nurture the potential economic development impact of
CLRL.
Nevertheless, there are some general economic and community development goals
that planners have sketched for Baltimore's light rail:

1. Improve access for employees to the rapidly growing suburban employment
centers in Hunt Valley and the aWl Airport area. Historically, the bulk of commuting in
the Baltimore region' has mainly involved workers traveling to the central city. "Now,"
as Maryland's Mass Transit Administration points out, "with the proliferation and
expansion of large suburban employment centers, traffic is significant both toward and
away from the downtown area. Outlying businesses are finding it increasingly difficult
to obtain workers while many within Baltimore City experience inconvenience in
commuting to suburban jobs."
For the Hunt Valley spur, the AA/DEIS explicitly raises so - called "reverse
commuting" as a light rail benefit. Hunt Valley is a rapidly developing, regional
commercial center and a designated growth area in Baltimore County's master plan.
The AA/DEIS estimates that the Hunt Valley extension of the CLRL would carry
approximately 1,500 daily reverse commuters to Hunt Valley, presumably many lowincome city residents to work in Hunt Valley's expanding commercial centers (U.S.
Department of Transportation, et aI., 1990).
Similarly, the AA/DEIS ' for the BWI spur mentions reverse commuting as a light rail
benefit: "It can be expected that businesses choosing to locate or expand in BWI,
particularly in the commercial and service sectors, will need to draw a significant
proportion of their employees from Baltimore City, many of whom will be heavily
reliant on public transportation to reach their jobs. As competition increases among
areas for service and blue collar workers ; and as the housing supply for lower-income
households in the BWI area is limited, the availability of efficient transit linkages
between Baltimore City and BWI will be an increasingly important factor in the
desirability of BWI as a place to work, and a place to do business" (U.S. Department of
Transportation, et aI., 1991).
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2. Provide efficient mass transit links to the new Orioles Park at Camden Yards
baseball stadium in downtown Baltimore. This spectacular new stadium is the core of
Baltimore's latest burst of downtown revitalization. The CLRL runs directly to the
refurbished Camden Station in front of the new stadium, efficiently connecting it to
suburban population centers in the central corridor. Indeed, local media have already
heralded the stadium-LRT connection as " a centerpiece for Baltimore's new emphasis
on mass transit (Baltimore Sun 1992). In any event, light rail was clearly envisioned
as an important component of stadium planning in downtown Baltimore.
II

3. Contribute to revitalization efforts in Baltimore's traditional downtown retail
district. Although Baltimore's Inner Harbor rebirth has received national acclaim, the
northwest sector of downtown Baltimore --the so-called Howard Street retail area-- has
continued the decline that began in the 1960s. Once the central shopping district in
the Baltimore region', the Howard Street area has been deserted by major department
stores and is now filled with vacant buildings and numerous vendors of low-price
merchandise.
The city's revitalization efforts in the area --creating an outdoor commercial mall,
building up the Lexington Market-- have not significantly improved the retail market,
nor has the !ocation of a Metro station at Lexington Market. However, the CLRL will
run down Howard Street as it winds its way to Camden Yards, and retailers hope that
the location of five light rail stops along Howard Street, including three in the heart of
the traditional shopping district, will help jump-start retail trade in the area.
In summary, Baltimore's light rail system was conceived to serve the region's
central corridor, where land development is already substantial, and where significant
employment growth is occurring. It is designed to accommodate and channel growth in
the northern and southern suburbs, and reinforce the downtown revitalization efforts
begun in the 1970s.,
It is, however, not a system that appears designed to stimulate development in
BaItim 0 r e 's dis t res sed inn e r cit y a'rea s; un Iike the h eav y r a i I Met r 0 s y st em, for
example, there are no CLRL stops in predominantly black, low-income neighborhoods
in Baltimore (with perhaps the exception of the Howar'd Street area that has
establishments catering disproportionately to low-income and minority clientele).
Through its links to the heavy rail system (transfer points will occur downtown), the
CLRL may improve neighborhood development prospects as well as employment
mobility for residents in predominantly black, low-income areas of Baltimore. However,
such benefits remain highly speculative, and, unfortunately, there is little evidence .that
Baltimore has embarked upon the extensive planning that would be necessary to
realize such benefits.
St. Louis is another city, similar in size to Milwaukee, that is moving ahead with a
light rail system. The St. Louis Metro Link will be an 18 mile, 20 station system,
running from Lambert-St. Louis International Airport, through a northwest and centralwest corridor, and across the Mississippi River to depressed East St. Louis. The
system will be anchored with a cluster of stations in downtown St. Louis. Taking
advantage of existing railroad, highway, and other public rights-of-way, Metro Link will
make maximum use of existing infrastructure and will require very little real estate
acquisition or property dislocation (Campion and Wischmeyer, 1989, 206). The
estimated capital costs of Metro Link are $341.7 million (1990 dollars), and the daily
ridership is forecast at 37,000 passengers by the year 2000.
Unlike the Baltimore CLRL, explicit economic development and land use
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considerations have figured prominently in planning Metro Link. As the final
environmental impact study of Metro Link concluded:

Unlike bus routes, LRT is perceived by the
developer/inves.tor as a "bankable" permanent (fixed)
investment and a public -sector commitment to long term CBO viability. The convention/hotel market,
entertainment attractions, specialty-retail shopping
facilities, and office and residential developments are
image - sensitive for both the user and the
developer/investor. The latter perceives LRT as a
positive factor in promoting St. Louis' "image," which
in turn influences the community's investment climate
and the success of area d'e velopment.
LRT's positive perception in
development/banking community and its
strengthen St. Louis' national image and
perception are among its strongest
development advantages ...

the
potential to
investment
economic

The priority corridor in St. Louis has been the
focus of considerable publicly -supported private
development aimed at reversing the effects of long term disinvestment ... Considerable investment in
infrastructure has also been made in the corridor.
The consideration of a major transit investment in the
St. Louis priority corridor is clearly consistent with
past public policy. The existence of these policies
enhances the ability to derive economic benefit from
a t ran sit i n ve s tm e n t ( U . S. 0 epa r t men t 0 f
Transportation et aI., 1987,5-4, 5-5).

The St. Louis study then identifies in detail the transit-related factors likely to
influence development in LRT station-areas: accessibility of sites for development and
redevelopment; concentrations of passenger volumes; parking requirements; and
evidence of long-term commitment. Based on these criteria, LRT station -areas were
categorized into four classes, reflecting evaluation of their economic development
potential:
1. Stations Generating No Significant Development
Impact (One station);
2. Stations Enhancing Existing or Planned
Development (Ten Stations, including four around the
CBD);
3. Stations Potentially Stimulating Nearby
Development (Seven Stations);
4. Stations Yielding Potential Joint
DevelopmentNalue Capture opportunities (Ten
stations with immediate potential as a result of strong
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market forces, available land for development or
redevelopment and existing or planned public-private
redevelopment activities).
In this final category, St. Louis' planners envision important public opportunities to
reap financial benefits, and potentially offset some of the costs of operating the LRT
system, from the transit-related investment returns that may be realized by private
investors around LRT stations. Special assessments, joint development partnerships, or
leasing/fee arrangements may enable St. Louis to "va lue capture" some of the transitstimulated benefits accruing to private investors from:
a. land value value increases;
b. retail sales increases or growth in commercial
activity;
c. employee/employer travel cost savings;
The final EIS for Metro Link estimates a potential for $ 21.9 million in one -time joint
development revenues for the public sector from light rail station development, and a
potential $1.1 million annual revenue stream from fees, leasing, and public shares in
income from 'transit-area joint development projects .
As a result of this preliminary station-location analysis, the St. Louis final
environmental impact statement offered conc'rete forecasts regarding the investment,
tax base, and employment impact around LRT stations in the St. Louis region: $532.1
million ($347.7 million in the city of St. Louis) in estimated capital investment
associated with economic development at or near LRT stations (in 1986 dollars); $5.6
million in estimated,annual tax revenues in the city of St. Louis and $3.5 in East St.
Louis associated with economic development at or near LRT stations; and over 26,000
permanent jobs and 6,700 temporary jobs connected with such station-area
development, the vast majority of which would be creat~d in the city of St. Louis.
These forecasts must be regarded as highly speculative as well as incomplete.
Although, for example, they attempt to systematically disentangle the LRT effects in
station locations from development currently underway or planned that might proceed
even without light rail, such distinctions are difficult to make with assurance.
Moreover, the projected development impacts and benefits are heaviest in strong
"market areas such as the central bu~.iness district; thus, there is some question
regarding how strongly these development benefits will accrue to St. Louis'
disadvantaged population and distressed neighborhoods. Finally, these estimates seem
high, given the daily ridership concentrations generally assumed to be required to
promote development around transit stations. St. Louis' projected daily ridership of
37,000 is, for example, far below the " significant development" threshold of 100,000
daily passengers suggested by King Cushman. While the concentration of riders around
certain stations (i.e., in the CBD) may be sufficient to induce ridership -generated
redevelopment, it is difficult to envision a system with 37,000 daily riders generating
the kind of development sketched in the Metro Link EIS. Although situations vary
between cities, certainly there is no evidence that Baltimore's heavy rail Metro, with
daily ridership now approaching 45,000, has produced the scale of development
sketched for St. Louis.
Nevertheless, although the numbers in the St. Louis EIS should not be taken
literally, in the broadest sense these projections do give some idea of the substantial
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economic development potential associated with light rail in St. Louis.
Lik.e most other cities with fixed rail transit systems, the bulk of development
around St. Louis' LRT system is anticipated downtown, where the strongest
development market exists and where the most extensive redevelopment activities and
plans are completed, underway, or contemplated. Similar to other rail systems
UWMCED examined, the St. Louis Metro Link does not appear to have been designed
or planned with inner city revitalization as a primary consideration. The inner city is
not avoided by LRT: as the system route a'l ignment turns northwest toward the airport,
three stations -- Delmar, Page, and St. Charles Rock Rd.-- serve primarily low -income
and minority populations. Moreover, there are two stations east of the riverfront, one
at Fifth and Missouri in downtown East St. Louis, perhaps the most distressed small
city in the United States. The exi~ting market forces at all of these stations are
characterized as "weak," with either vacant or underutilized land-use the predominant
pattern. Pres u m a bl y, one expe ctati'on in St. Loui s is that LRT will perm it the
predominantly minority residents of these high unemployment neighborhoods to gain
better transit access to employment downtown, as well as jobs in the northwest
corridor approaching the airport. But it remains to be seen how extensively the city of
St. Louis, as well as other public development entities with authority along the LRT
route, will implement the complementary development policies necessary to stimulate
transit-led n~ighborhood revitalization.
Conclusion: The Transit-Development Connection

What are the apparent lessons of these case studies for Milwaukee as this region
considers building a light rail transit system? As we noted at the outset, UWMCED
has drawn three basic conclusions:
1. Fixed rail investments can have positive, but modest land use
and development impacts;
2. Ridership is a crucial ingredient in promoting transit stimulated economic development;
3. Additional public intervention is required to maximize the
development possibilities offered by fixed rail systems.
Development does not automatically follow the construction of a
fixed rail system. In areas with strong existing development
markets, there are a variety of "value capture" and "joint
development" techniques that have been deployed in cities such
Atlanta, Washington, D.C ~ , Portland, and San Francisco to
leverage private investment and defray the costs of mas~ transit
for the pub,lic: leasing of air rights or concessions in or around
stations; benefit assessment fees to capture the increased
"value" created for private investors by transit; joint publicprivate development projects; and "connector fees" for physical
links between private developments and transit stations .

In neighborhoods with weak markets, public policy incentives
for development are essential if fixed rail investments are to
produce any economic development benefits.
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In addition to these basic conclusions, several more specific lessons seem to stand
out from the experiences of the cities we examined:
4. Coordination and cooperation between transit officials and
development/land use agencies is essential if the full
development benefits of rail transit are to be realized. The
transportation and economic development issues in system planning cannot be considered in isolation from one another.
Concomitantly, all relevant public planning bodies in a region
must be' involved in system-planning, if rational, region-wide
development/land u~e coordination around transit is to be
accomplished. The refusal of suburban counties north of Atlanta
to par'ticipate in MARTA has limited the full realization of
economic benefits from that rail system.
5. Complementary transit policies are necessary to promote LRT
ridership and contribute to development around LRT stations
and corridors. These include appropriate
limitations on parking
in downtown areas (i.e. avoiding the "Miami syndrome"), and
providing, adequate parking facilities and feeder-bus service at
outlying stations.
6. Participation by neighborhood groups and private
developers
in transit station area planning should be an explicit element
early in system design. Station
locations and route alignments
should recognize the potential development contribution of LRT,
particularly in
areas outside of the central business district and
in dis,tressed areas of the inner city.
7. System con~truction costs can be minimized by the use of
abandoned railway rights-of-way and other existing
infrastructure. Such decisions have been credited with limiting
the construction costs of LRT in Sacramento to the lowest in
mile). However, as the
North America ($9.6 million per system
case of Miami seems to show, a balance needs to be struck
between this kind of cost-consciousness, and building rail lines
where they can do the most good in terms of economic and
neighborhood development. Although the "existing rights -ofway" approach may reduce the land acquisition costs for transit
corridors, it may also "preclude significant transit station area
development because of a ,weak market or fragmented land
ownership" (Witherspoon, 1982, 346).
8. Not only is development not an automatic outcome from
fixed rail investments, but it does not occur overnight
either.
As virtually every case UWMCED examined reveals,
development impacts frequently take 10-20 years or more
before they are fully realized; this apparently has been the case
even in successful transit/development planning settings such as
Toronto.
9 . On the whole, LRT will likely exert less of an influence on
local economic development and land use than heavy rail
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investments. This is because LRT generally carries a lower
volume of ridership~ involves less elaborate station-areas, and
the ref 0 r e will n'0 t pro due e the sam e kin d s 0 f "g a ins i n
accessibility" that promote
redevelopment around heavy rail
station areas (Cervero, 1984, 134).

On the whole, the record shows that there is much public planners can do to
exploit the development opportunities created by light rail. For the most part, however,
the planning and design of rail transit systems in U.S. cities has failed to exploit the
land use and neighborhood redevelopment potential offered by such investments. In
particular, distressed inner city areas of America's central cities have failed to realize
significant gains from new transit systems. As Leon S. Eplan points out, taking full
advantage of the development and redevelopment opportunities of transit investments
requires broad public vision and creative 'public policy: "Benefits are not worth the time
and money being spent to capture them if all that is to be achieved amounts to a
building here, a tunnel there, or a direct connection into retail shops" (Eplan, 1979,
143).
Truly significant community development benefits can be realized from transit
investments,. But transit offers only the opportunity to achieve these benefits; much
more in the way of public policy will be necessary. As Robert Witherspoon puts it,
transit-led development is "the result of hard work and attention to detail by business
and government, rather than some invisible hand guiding land use decisions at transit
locations" (Witherspoon, 1982, 345).
If the record of other cities is any indicator, light rail in Milwaukee won't
fundamentally restructure land use patterns in the region or produce billions of dollars
of development that would not otherwise have occurred. But, when combined with
other public investments and public-private partnerships, LRT would appear to offer the
possibility of stimulating some development in distressed areas of the city, and
rechanneling some future growth in more efficient, higher-density location patterns.
Given these possibilities, UWMCED recommends that an explicit and participatory
land-use/community developmenJ planning process be established as part of the LRT
planning effort in Milwaukee. Funding should be provided for detailed development
planning along proposed routes and around station areas. The process of designating
route alignments and station locations, while fundamentally a transportation, ,
environmental, and fiscal decision, should also explicitly include an economic and
community development component; that is, cost-benefit analysis should be done to
consider the trade-offs between, for example, dollars saved in using a particular rightof-way as opposed to development that might be created by locating stations in a
particular Milwaukee neighborhood. Finally, particularly for the weak market conditions
around potential inner city station-areas, sources of additional development financing
should be identified and packaged to encourage development and job creation around
these sites.
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SECTION IV:
LIGHT RAIL A ND LOCAL REIN DUSTRIALIZATION
As we briefly mentioned in section II of this study, one potential long-t erm economic
impact of light rail in Milwaukee is the stimulus LRT could provide to the creation of a
mass transit industry in this region. With complementary public policies, the initial
public works expenditures for LRT could be strategically used, for example, to
encourage the development of new, potential export sectors of the Milwaukee
economy --the manufacture of mass transit vehicles is one possibility-- that would help
bolster Milwaukee's industrial base and preserve and create good, family-supporting
jobs in the communi~ y.
.
This approach of using the construction of a rail transit system as a tool of local
industrial policy has received considerable recent attention in Los Angeles. In January
1992, the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission canceled a $122 million
contract to purchase 87 rail transit cars from the Japanese Sumitomo Corporation. As
The New York Times reported: "Transportation officials voted to build their own $49
million factory to build the cars and keep the jobs in Los Angeles with the hope of
making Southern California the national center of a reinvigorated American mass
transit industry, producing 600 rail cars and 6,000 buses over the next 30 years"
(Reinhold, 1992, A8). A local L.A. transit advocate pointed out that construction of
the 300-mile Los Angeles rail mass transit system is "the largest public works project
in th-e United States, involving $1 50 billion over 30 years. Maybe we can bring some
industry to this area" (Reinhold, 1992, A8) .
One plan calls for conversion of an automobile plant in the Van Nuys area of Los
Angeles that General Motors plans to shut down this summer into a mass transit
vehicle manufacturing facility. The envisioned plant would initially produce two rail
cars a week and create 200 direct jobs, with the Transportation Commission
estimating that a 60 percent local content production. requirement for mass transit
vehicles would create 740 direct jobs in Los Angeles (and 4,445 in the United States).
The plant would be owned by ~A County but operated by private companies that
would produce rail cars for the LA system, but presumably could also export vehicles
to other cities with rail systems.
A "Project California" has begun to mobilize California manufacturing and
engineering companies to convert from military and aerospace production to mass
transit. Transit officials envision a mobilization of industrial know -how, producing
technological advances in transit equipment --in the production of lightweight vehicles
or improving vehicle acoustics, for example -- that might establish LA - based
manufacturers as major players in the world transit-vehicle market (Metro Magazine,
1992, 22). As one report put it: "If successful, the [LA] plant could foreshadow the
revival of what was once a thriving American industry in mass transit, long since
ceded to the Japanese, Italians, and Canadians" (Reinhold, 1992).
If Los Angeles is effective in using rail system investment as a lever for the
creation of a local mass transit production industry, it will be following in the
spectacularly successful footsteps of Montreal and the Quebec provincial government.
In the early 1970s, as the city of Montreal was expanding its Métro subway system,
the Montreal Urban Community Transit Commission invited the local manufacturer of
the "Ski-Doo" snowmobile, Bombar.dier, to bid on production of the vehicles necessary
for the Metro expansion . Bombardier's $117 million offer was accepted in 1974, and,
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even though the company was still at that time mainly a snowmobile manufacturer, it
now had a new market niche: mass transit. "Thanks to this first contract, one analyst
has written, lithe company could develop a new sector of activity that employs today
thousands at its Montreal offices and La Pocatiere factories (Dagenais, 1987).
II

T his initial Métro contract, along with subsequent public transit system contracts
to produce commuter railcars and buses in the Montreal region and elsewhere in
Quebec, provided Bombardier with a publicly-created market to develop expertise and
export-potential in its new production activities . The role of public market stimulus
was crucial for Bombardier, as it was for U. S. aerospace and computer manufacturers
who relied for years on the public market created by defense department contracts,
before developing their private market potential. Bombardier's retooling to become a
world -class mass transit vehicle manufacturer was al.so significantly aided by public
industrial development assistance, with the infusion of low-cost capital in the form of
subsidized loans from the Quebec Pension Fund (the Caisse de depot et placement)
and a Quebec government business development fund (Ia Societe generale de
financement) (Levine, 1990, 156 - 163; Fraser, 1987, 152-163).
Strategically supported by public markets and publicly -subsidized capital,
Bombardier has developed into one of the leading mass transit vehicle manufacturers in
the world. It has accrued $4 billion in mass transit sales over the past 17 years, and
now has plants building railcars and transit rolling stock not only in Quebec, but in
Ontario, Vermont, France, Belgium, Britain, Austria, and Mexico. Some of the
Bombardier's most notable transit sales: bi -Ievel subway cars for Chicago's METRA,
light rail vehicles for Portland's MAX, subway cars for Mexico City, rail transit vehicles
in Boston, the monorail in Disneyworld, and, in the Bombardier's most celebrated coup,
an 825 vehicle, $1 billion contract in 1982 to manufacture New York City's subway
cars. Bombardier has also branched out into the manufacture of high -speed rail
vehicles, and is part of consortia bidding for the development of high-speed lines in
Texas, in the Chicago-Detroit corridor, and the Quebec City-Windsor corridor in eastern
Canada.
All told, Bombardier now has 25,000 employees worldwide, and is a major source
of high -quality, industrial employment in Montreal and Quebec. It is important to
underscore, however, that all of this success in global markets started in 1974 with a
Montreal Métro contract given to a snowmobile manufacturer --and then supported by
substantial government industrial policy assistance. In addition, the engineering and
transit-system design expertise gained in construction and operation of the Montreal
Métro has spun-off economic development beyond simply the success of Bombardier.
Several Montreal - based consulting and engineering firms are now successful
competitors in world markets for transit system design and engineering: SNC-Lavalin,
for example, recently received a $2.6 billion contract to design the Bangkok subway.
In short, the creative use of public works expenditure for the Montreal Metro,
combined with supportive government industrial policy and private sector
entrepreneurialism, generated the development of a mass transit manufacturing,
consulting, and engineering complex in the city, with benefits across the entire
province of Quebec.
A final example we have examined of creative economic development policy
associated with rail transit occurred in the Pittsburgh in the 1980s. Rather than directly
import $53.3 million of light rail vehicles (LRVs) for its reconstructed light rail system,
Pittsburgh decided to fill the order for Siemens Duewag LRVs by requiring that the
vehicles be assembled in the plant of Blaw-Knox Equipment Inc., a specialty railcar and
metal fabricating company located in the Pittsburgh suburb of Blaw -Knox. The
vehicles' propulsion system and frames are built in Dusseldorf, disassembled, shipped,
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and then reassembled at the Blaw-Knox plant. It is estimated that at least 64 percent
of the LRV will be composed of American -made products, and that filling the initial
LRV order would mean 70 assembly jobs in Pittsburgh . Pittsburgh planners heralded
the arrangement as an excellent partnership, giving Siemens a "foothold in the
blossoming light rail market," while having the potential of making Pittsburgh "a
national center of the light rail industry" (Fisher, 1983).
All three of these examples -- from the phenomenal world-class success of
Bombardier, to the more modest local-content arrangements of Pittsburgh and Siemens
Duewag, to the ambitious plans of the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission
and Project California-- offer important lessons for Milwaukee in planning for maximum
economic benefits from an investment in light rail. LRT should not be conceived as
merely a transportation expenditure, or a one -time public works boost to the local
economy. Rather, an investment in LRT can be strategically deployed to stimulate
reindustrialization a'nd the development of a Milwaukee -based mass transit industry
that could potentially become an important element in the export base of the local
economy. There is currently a 1,000 vehicle market for LRVs in North America, with
large growth potential as LRT systems are planned in the U.S., Canada, and Euro'pe,
and as vehicles are replaced in existing systems (Schumann, 1989, 17; Bayliss, 1989,
43-61). Moreover, as the case of Bombardier demonstrates, truly successful spin-off
industries n~ed not be limited to the original product line; in the same fashion that
Bombardier moved from producing subway cars, to buses, commuter railcars, light rail
vehicles, and high-speed rail equipment, an entrepreneurial and competitive Milwaukeebased LRV manufacturer could conceivably branch out into other lines of mass transit
equipment, creating hundreds or thousands of jobs in the process. Finally, the
development of a successful mass transit vehicle industry could also result in the
blossoming of related industries in engineering, consulting, and design; like the
Montreal case, a light rail industry "complex" could be developed in Milwaukee, with
the right mixture of strategic planning, public investment, and private venture capital.
Thus, in our judgment, the permanent employment benefits of LRT can be
significantly enhanced by creatively using LRT to stimulate sectors ' of the local
economy and nurture new industries. The Milwaukee r.egion currently lacks a railcar
manufacturer; thus, the UWMCED-RSRI input - output model of the impact of
expenditures for LRT assumes that all LRVs would be imported, and, as we pointed out
in section II, would constitute "leakage" from the regional economy of the capital
outlays for light rail. However, as Table 1 2 indicates, UWMCED estimates
considerable employment, output, and wage benefits if a local manufacturer -- or
consortium of manufacturers-- could be retooled to produce the estimated $52 million
in LRVs that will be ordered for the proposed Milwaukee light rail system. Almost
1,000 additional jobs could be created through local production of the LRVs, the
majority of them well-paying ($30,000 + annually) manufacturing jobs. For the city of
Milwaukee, having suffered a severe erosion in manufacturing employment since
1979, such industrial job creation would indeed be welcome.
In addition, UWMCED estimates that if a local rail vehicle manufacturer could be
established and prove capable of generating, say $100 million of production contracts
annually, this industry could provide around 1,800 permanent jobs, $5 5.6 million in
income, and $12 . 7 million in state and local taxes for the Milwaukee regional
economy. These estimates, incidentally, are in line with estimates that a recent $99
million contract to Bombardier to produce rolling stock for a Montreal suburban
commuter line will generate around 1,600 jobs (Authier, 1992, E1).
In light of these estimates, UWMCED recommends that the City of Milwaukee and
the State of Wisconsin seriously consider ways to facilitate the local production of
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LRVs for the Milwaukee light rail system, and to explore the feasibility of developing a
local mass transit vehicle production industry, initially around LRT. A strategic
planning process should be established, as design of the LRT system moves forward,
to develop a framework in which potential local producers can be identified, and in
which various public-sector economic 'development programs can be coordinated to
support such an industry in Milwaukee.

TABLE 12:
The Potential Significance of Local Production
of Light Rail Vehicles on the Economic Impact
LRT in the Milwaukee Metropolitan Region
(Employment in jobs, not full -time equivalents)
(Dollar figures in thousands)

Employment

Output

Wages

1. LRT Construction Impact
with imported LRVS

6,041

365,328

178,719

2. LRT Construction Impact
with local LRV production

7,000

446,113

207,720

959

80,785

29,001

Regional Benefits of Local
LRV Production (2) - (1)

Source: UMCED estimate, calculated fro,m RSRI model
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SECTION V:
LIGHT RA IL, MIN ORITY ECONOMIC DEV ELOPM ENT, AND
MILWA UKEE 'S INNER CITY
We touched, in section III of this study, on a crucial issue in evaluating the
potential economic impact of rail transit: the degree to which rail investments have
contributed to inner city revitalization in other cities. In this section, we pull together
some of these points in addressing a primary concern for LRT in Milwaukee: how can
such a major public investment be utilized to promote inner city revitalization and
minority economic development in this region.
The level of need in Milwaukee's distressed, predominantly African American inner
city has been well -d'o cumented and need not be rehashed here. Sufficed to say, there
is nothing short of an economic crisis in Milwaukee's inner city. Official black
unemployment rates for metropolitan Milwaukee have been unacceptably high -,for
several years --14.0 percent in 1988,20.1 in 1989, and 16.6 percent in 1990-- and
most observers believe the true unemployment rate --including discouraged workers
and others not in the labor market-- is much higher. Given these unemployment
numbers, as. well as data showing growing numbers of the working poor as well, it is
small surprise that the Milwaukee County Department of Health and Human Services
estimated that in 1987 over 43 percent of total income in Milwaukee County's
African-American community was derived from government transfer payments.

In light of this level of economic need, and combined with the fiscal constraints
under which local government in Milwaukee now operates, it is imperative that
Milwaukee policymakers look closely at how a major public expenditure such as $41 7
million for an LRT can be targeted to yield economic benefits to the inner city and
minority communities.
Unfortunately, as the case studies examined in section III indicate, there is not a
great deal of encouraging guidance from the experiences of other cities in strategically
using fixed rail investments as part of an inner city redevelopment strategy. In fact,
the record of other communities,. suggests that unless concerns of minority economic
development and inner city revitalization are explicitly introduced to the rail transit
system planning process, concrete economic benefits for minorities may be limited.
In Atlanta, benefits were provided for minority contractors and professionals with
MBE and affirmative action requirements in the construction of the MARTA rapid rail
system. However, the exclusion of growing northern counties from the system limited
the ability of MARTA to transport black city dwellers to expanding employment centers
in the metropolitan area. Moreover, station locations and route alignments viewed as
important to minority neighborhood development in Atlanta --such as the Proctor Creek
spur-- have been delayed, while neighborhoods continue to deteriorate (in much the
same fashion, for example, that San Francisco's BART serviced small, predominantly
white suburban communities while avoiding Hunter's Point). Finally, MARTA financing
was, in part, from a regressive sales tax that disproportionately burdens low -income
black residents .
Similarly, in the other cases UWMC ED examined, minority community or inner city
concerns were not at the top of the transit planning agenda. Even in Baltimore --where
the heavy rail Metro runs through predominantly black, inner city-type neighborhoods
in West Baltimore, and where the city received UMTA "urban initiatives" money to
stimulate development around stations in these distressed neighborhoods-- there has
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been inadequate coordination of other economic development resources with the city's
transit investments to enable the Baltimore Metro to function as much of a catalyst for
inner city redevelopment.
On the other hand, Baltimore's new light rail system, the CLRL, essentially avoids
the city's inner-city neighborhoods. Little explicit planning was done on how the CLRL
might improve economic conditions in the inner city, and the CLRL is primarily
designed as a downtown-anchored system that is connected to suburban corridors.
Such a design represents perfectly rational transportation planning and even land-use
logic --the CLRL runs through important regional growth corridors-- but does not
particularly serve the interests of Baltimore's inner-city. There has been some vague
thought --although, again, without much explicit planning or analysis-- that when fully
developed to Hunt Valley and Baltimore-Washington International Airport, the CLRL can
expand economic opportunities for low-income city residents by permitting "reverse
commuting" from the city to expanding employment centers. But this possibility has
merely been mentioned as a potential CLRL "economic benefit;" no explicitly transitlinked zoning, development, or training programs have been put into place to achieve
.
these employment goals.
The St. Louis Metro Link light rail system, although clearly envisioned as a regional
system anchored in downtown St. Louis, also will have three stops in predominantly
black, lOW-Income neighborhoods in St. Louis (one in the city and two in St. Louis
County), and a terminus in downtown East St. Louis, a predominantly African American and deeply impoverished small city just over the Mississippi River. Yet, at
this point, there are no systematic or coherent plans to coordinate the vast additional
resources that would be necessary to promote development around stations in these
neighborhoods. Station-area market studies have been conducted, but no task forces
or extensive planning processes have been organized to move the transit-related
development process along in these poorer neighborhoods. Given the disastrous social
and economic conditions in, for example, East St. Louis, it will take substantially more
than building an LRT station at Fifth and Missouri to stimulate economic development,
and there are no signs that LRT will be accompanied by the additional m'assive publicprivate investments that would be necessary. In fact, jn the minds of some St. Louis
transit planners, the East St. Louis stops may be considered as politically necessary to
realize their major goal: extensio.n of the LRT as a truly regional system into the other
communities in southern Illinois. Such underlying logic hardly bespeaks a major
commitment to using LRT to promote economic development in poorer areas.
Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the Metro Link EIS, reverse commuting
may also be a potential benefit of LRT in St. Louis, perhaps providing greater access
for inner-city residents to jobs in the corridors leading out to the airport. Again,
however, no elaborate planning has been put into place to achieve this goal.
In summary, the record in urban America on using rail transit investments to
revitalize inner-city neighborhoods or promote minority economic development is not a
strong one. However, UWMCED believes that, with inner-city and minority concerns
elevated to a primary position in transit planning, that building a light rail system in
Milwaukee could yield significant economic benefits for inner-city neighborhoods and
minority communities. In particular, five specific approaches could be pursued:
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1. Explicit minority hiring and contracting requirements
in the construction and operation of LRT in Milwaukee:
Based on UWMCED's input-output estimates of the employment impact of
constructing LRT in Milwaukee, a 30 percent minority hiring requirement could yield
1,800 jobs and $56 .3 million in wages for Milwaukee minorities during the 4 -5 year
construction phase of the project. Similar requirements for operating and maintaining
the system --and current plans are to locate the LRT maintenance facilities in
Milwaukee's inner-city -- could generate 202 jobs and $3.4 million in wages for
minorities .

2 . Implementation of reindu strialization strategies
oriented around mass transit 'manufacturing in Milwaukee:

Success in using LRT expenditures as a strategic lever to develop a mass
transit industry in Milwaukee will provide important economic benefits for minorities.
For African-American workers who have been displaced as local manufacturers such as
A.D. Smith .have downsized since the early 1980s, development of a new manu facturing sector in Milwaukee would offer major economic opportunity.

3. Creation of public-private partnerships for development
around inner-city LRT station-areas, and
4. Targeted public investment to enhance the market for
investm~nt around inner-city stations:
In the fragile and neglected economy of Milwaukee's inner-c ity, the "Field of
Dreams" approach to transit/development planning is 'completely inappropriate. A major
inner-city redevelopment initiative would need to accompany and be coordinated with
LRT planning, to stimulate development in areas currently experiencing disinvestment
and commercial abandonment, and with weak private development markets.

5. Routing of light rail lines to improve access of innercity residents to industrial parks and suburban employment
locations.

One way light rail could contribute to minority economic development would be by
alleviating the well -discussed spatial mismatch in this region: substantial employment
growth in suburban areas and outlying areas of the city combined with high
unemployment and limited access to job growth areas for minorities in Milwaukee's
inner-city. The logic of "reverse commuting" could alleviate this mismatch and provide
job access to inner-city residents.
However, complementary transportation, zoning, and land -use policies will be
required as well. Suburban job locat ions are dispersed; thus, one LRT line will not
effectively link the inner-city to outlying pockets of employment. Without adequate
feeder bus service or other transit links, LRT will not measurably improve access to
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suburban jobs. Moreover, in the future, unless regional planning effectively concen trates employment growth, preferably around LRT routes --through zoning or land-use
policies-- the potential efficacy of LRT in efficiently linking city residents and suburban
jobs will be vitiated. In other words, like the matter of promoting redevelopment
around stati ons, there is nothing automa'tic a bout transit - em pi oyment im pacts:
additional planning and policies will be necessary to achieve this economic benefit of
LRT.

Conclusion
The burden of alleviating all of Milwaukee's social and economic problems should
not be placed on light rail. LRT is, at root, a transportation system that, we believe,
can have significant economic ben.e fits in this region. But LRT is not the "magic
bullet" that will enable us to revitalize the inner-city or end poverty and unemployment
in Milwaukee.
However, if properly planned and coordinated with a wide range of other economic
development policies, LRT can make a significant contribution toward improving
economic opportunity for Milwaukee's minority communities. Such considerations need
to be place:d near the top of the LRT planning process, not viewed as me.rely a
politically expedient after-thought. UWMCED recommends that an Inner City Light Rail
Task Force be established, to systematically review the options presented above -- as
well as others that may be proposed -- as ways of integrating inner-city redevelopment
and minority economic development issues with LRT planning.
No city has effectively placed inner city concerns at the top of the planning agenda
in building fixed rail systems, and as a result there have been limited economic benefits
for inner city resiqents . Milw.aukee has an opportunity, with this major public
investment, to establish new and productive links between mass transit and minority
economic development.

59

NOTES

1 For further information on the use of input-output models, and on how
to interpret conclusions drawn from them, see Coughlin and Mandelbaum
(1 991 ).

2 These employment estimates are in actual jobs, not full-time equivalent
employment. The RSRI model does not break employment down into full t ime or part-time positions.
3 For the estimate of $19.4 million in annual operations and maintenance
expenditures for the Milwauke.e LRT, UWMCED estimates the following
impacts:

Employment: 791 jobs
Output: $26.6 million
Wages: $13.1 million
State and Local Taxes: $3.02 million
4 We have deliberately excluded from our comparative analysis the older,
pre-196'0 fixed rail systems such as New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, or
Boston, whose systems were built during a much different period in urban
development. When initially built, all of these systems had a major impact
on land-use: "streetcar" suburbs are a basic part of U.S. urban history that
bespeak the land -use and urban development influence of early rail systems. But, clearly, it would be misleading to analyze the experience of
these systems as potential indicators of what the impact might be of 1990s
fixed rail systems.

It is worth noting, however, that even in these older, more
established fixed rail settings; employment decentralization and suburban
sprawl have occurred at the same pace as cities without rail systems. In
fact, as Table 10 reveals, Milwaukee, a city without fixed rail, has done
much better than most U.S. cities in retaining metropolitan area population
in the central city.
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LRT ECONOMIC IMPACT ESTIMATE: SYSTEM
(EMPLOYMENT IN JOBS, NOT FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS )
(DOLLAR FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)
EMPLOYMENT
AGRICULTURE
AGRI. SERV., FORESTRY, & FISH
MI.NING
CONSTRUCTION
MANUFACTURING
TRANSPORT. & PUBLIC UTILITIES
WHOLESALE
RETAIL TRADE
FINANCE, INS., & REAL ESTATE
SERVICES

DIRECT EFFECTS
INDIRECT AND INDUCED EFFECTS
TOTAL EFFECTS
MULTIPLIERS
WAGES-NET OF TAXES=

142794.7

ST TAXES-VISITORS INDIRECT ST TAXES
TOTAL STATE TAXES

27382.5
27382.5

LOC TAXES-VISITORS=
INDIRECT LOC TAXES=
TOTAL LOCAL TAXES =

16258.6
16258.6

GEN. FEDERAL TAXES=
SOC SECURITY TAXES=
TOT. FEDERAL TAXES=

32745.2
23263.4
56008.6

OTHER VALUE ADDED
TOTAL VALUE ADDED

VALUE ADDED

6.4
17.1
3086.2
578.2
211.1
218.9
768.5
261.8
821.3

44.1
263.7
1567.6
190461.2
56014.0
19207.7
20153.7
20267.2
16299.9
38728.7

9.5
89.1
529.0
113550.1
17515.1
6553.7
6749.3
8985.8
5441.2
18201.5

13.7
111.2
1034.0
190461.2
23741.1
11209.8
12108.0
12294.9
9539.2
23107.8

70.8

2320.5

1094.9

1120.4

•0

•0

•0

•0

3886.2
2154.3
6040.5

259452.4
105876.0
365328.3

138536.6
40182.6
178719.2

224927.3
59813.9
284741.2

1.554

1.408

1.290

1.266

.1

GOVERNMENT
ADMIN. AUXILIARY

WAGES

OUTPUT

•0

.0

42296.8
284741.2

DIRECT EXPENDITURES WITHIN REGION
DIRECT EXPENDITURES IN OTHER REGIONS
TOTAL INITIAL EXPENDITURE

259452.4
157675.4
417127.8

EFFECTS PER MILLION DOLLARS OF INITIAL EXPENDITURE
EMPLOYMENT =
14.5 (JOBS)
INCOME
$
428451.9
STATE TAXES
$
65645.3
LOCAL TAXES
$
38977 . 5
VALUE ADDED
$
682623.4

LRT ECONOMIC IMPACT ESTIMATE: SYSTEM
(EMPLOYMENT IN JOBS, NOT FULL- TIME EQUIVALENTS)
(DOLLAR FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)
EMPLOYMENT
AGRICULTURE
DAIRY PROD., POULTRY, & EGGS
MEAT ANIMALS · & MISC. LIVESTOCK
COTTON
GRAINS, & MISC. CROPS
TOBACCO
FRU~TS,
NUTS, & VEGETABLES
FOREST PROD.
GREENHOUSE & NURSERY PROD.
AGRI. SERV., FORESTRY, & FISH
AGRI. SERVICES (07)
FORESTRY (08)
FISHING,HUNTING,&TRAPPING (09)
MINING
METAL MINING (10)
ANTHRACITE MINING (11)
BITUM. COAL & LIGNITE
(12)
OIL & GAS. EXTRACTION (13)
NONMETAL MIN.-EX. FUELS (14)
CONSTRUCTION
GENERAL BLDG. CONTRACTORS (15)
HEAVY CONST. CONTRACTORS (16)
SPECIAL TRADE CONTRACTORS (17)
MANUFACTURING
FOOD & KINDRED PROD. (20)
TOBACCO MANUFACTURES (21)
TEXTILE MILL PROD. (22)
APPAREL & OTHER PROD. (23)
LUMBER & WOOD PROD. (24)
FURNITURE & FIXTURES (25)
PAPER & ALLIED PROD. (26)
PRINTING & PUBLISHING (27)
CHEMICALS & ALLIED PROD. (28)
PETROLEUM & COAL PROD. (29)
RUBBER & MISC. PLASTICS (30)
LEATHER & LEATHER PROD. (31)
STONE, CLAY, & GLASS (32)
PRIMARY METAL PROD. (33)
FABRICATED METAL PROD. (34)
MACHINERY, EXCEPT ELEC. (35)
ELECTRIC & ELEC. EQUIP. (36)
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT (37)
INSTRUMENTS & REL. PROD. (38)
MISC. MANUFACTURING IND'S (39)
TRANSPORT. & PUBLIC UTILITIES
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION (40)
LOCAL PASS. TRANSIT (41)
TRUCKING & WAREHOUSING (42)
WATER TRANSPORTATION (44)
TRANSPORTATION BY AIR (45)
PIPE ~INES- EX. NAT. GAS (46)
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES (47)

·1
•0
•0
•0

OUTPUT

WAGES

VALUE ADDED

44.1
34.8

9.5
6.5

13.7
8.8

.2

•0
•0

.0
.0

.0

•0
•0

8.5
•6

2.7
·3

4.4
.5

•0
•0
•0

•0
.0
.0

·0
•0
•0

•0
•0

6.4
5.5

89.1
87.0
1.2

17.1

263.7
251.6
10.3
1.8
1567.6

•0
•0
•0
•0

•0

•0

.0
.0
·0

•0

.8

·1

17.1
3086.2
399.2
680.2
2006.8
578.2
34.2
•0

3.4
5.5
5.9
1.2
6.9
35.4
7.2
1.6
4.0
·8

96.7
9.4
215.6
23.6
95.9
23.0
3.3
4.4
211.1
•0

28.6
126.4
·6
2.8
·0

4.9

1567.6
190461.2
21408.5
63177.5
105875.2
56014.0
5982.4
.3

180.7
322.1
430.1
85.1
794.8
2341.8
1419.4
370.5
367.6
65.5
9203.3
1185.3
19686.5
2388.8
7951.2
2686.1
268.8
283.6
19207.7

.9

529.0

•0
•0

529.0
113550.1
12376.9
39302.0
61871.2
17515.1
909.2
·1

57.6
103.2
137.6
28.4
217.9
857.9
278.3
78.9
106.8
23.0
3138'-8
314.2
6429.8
840.6
2947.3
841.8
101.0
102.7
6553.7

.0

111.2
106.3
3.9
1.0
1034.0
•0
•0
•0

·0
1034.0
190461.2
21408.5
63177.5
105875.2
23741.1
1498.9
·1

81.9
127.0
145.5
35.4
294.5
1062.3
468.8
85.8
139.0
28.1
3726.6
374.2
9464.9
1171.7
3378.3
1369.2
141.4
147.5
11209.8

.0

•0

•0

835.9
8715.4
51.4
218.1

454.8
3915.5
11.3
90.7

552.8
5655.9
18.7
120.9

.0

•0

•0

205.6

99.2

132.2

COMMUNICATION (48)
ELEC.,GAS,&SANITARY SERVo

(49)

WHOLESALE
WHLSALE- DURABLE- GOODS (50)
WHLSALE-NONDURABLE GOODS (51)
RETAIL TRADE
BLDG. MAT. - GARDEN SUPPLY (52)
GENERAL MERCH. STORES (53)
FOOD STORES (54)
AUTO. DEALERS-SERV. STAT. (55)
APPAREL & ACCESS. STORES (56)
FURNITURE & HOME FURNISH. (57)
EATING & DRINKING PLACES (58)
MISCELLANEOUS RETAIL (59)
FINANCE, INS.,
REAL ESTATE
BANKING (60 )
CREDIT AGENCIES EX. BANKS (61)
SECURITY, COMM. BROKERS (62)
INSURANCE, CARRIERS (63)
INS. AGENTS, BROKERS (64)
REAL ESTATE (65)
COMB. REAL ESTATE, INS. (66)
HOLDING-OTH. INV .. OFF'S (67)
SERVICES
HOTELS & OTHER LODGING (70)
PERSONAL SERVICES (72)
BUSINESS SERVICES (73)
AUTO REPAIR,SERV.,GARAGES (75)
MISC. REPAIR SERVICES (76)
MOTION PICTURES (78)
AMUSEMENT & RECREATION · (79)
HEALTH SERVICES (80)
LEGAL SERVICES (81)
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES (82)
SOCIAL SERVICES (83)
MUSEUMS,BOTAN-ZOO.GARDENS (84)
MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS (86)
MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES (89)
GOVERNMENT
ADMIN. AUXILIARY
TOTAL
MULTIPLIERS
WAGES - NET OF TAXES=

142794.7

TOTAL STATE TAXES

27382.5

TOTAL LOCAL TAXES

16258.6

OTHER VALUE ADDED =
TOTAL VALUE ADDED

42296.8
284741.2

27.4
20.4

2659.7
6521.5

1121.0
861.3

1893.0
2836.4

218.9
158.1
60.8
768.5
29.9
92.6
94.8
65.0
38.1
19.0
229.4
199.7
261.8
81.2

20153.7
16475.0
3678.7
20267.2
1062.2
3122.5
2399.2
2704.1
1083.2
785.4
5223.9
3886.7
16299.9
4564.8

6749.3
5100.9
1648.5
8985.8
490.6
1132.2
1119.5
1361.8
395.5
340.1
1903.2
2242.8
5441.2
2073.6

12108.0
9897.9
2210.1
12294.9
682.5
2006.4
1541.7
1737.6
696.0
504.7
2628.5
2497.5
9539.2
2650.2

.0

.0

.0

•0

9.4
45.6
31.7
78.2
1.6
14.3
821.3
18.6
85.9
145.6
52.0
43.2
1.6
23.7
67 '. 0
11.1
31.1
34.1
48.9
258.0

791.2
4827.3
1490.2
3951.5
78.8
596.0
38728.7
431.3
1921.4
58'22 '.4
3381.1
1392.1
43.8
767.2
3429.8
904.7
1012.7
763.0
29.3
1692.7
17137.1

476.9
1384.2
868.2
401.0
8.0
229.3
18201.5
160.4
949.0
2979.4
1143.3
754.6
14.3
255.4
1751.4
542.6
501.1
393.7
13.0
687.3
8056.-1

387.4
2047.7
1099.1
3113.8
62.1
178.8
23107.8
231.9
1358.5
3842.5
1747.4
910.1
19.7
311.8
2357.7
667.4
509.8
468.6
13.5
894.7
9774.1

70.8

2320.5

1094.9

1120.4

.0

.0

.0

.0

6040.5
1.554

365328.3
1.408

178719.2
1.290

284741.2
1.266

.6

TOTAL INITIAL EXPENDITURE

417127.8

EFFECTS PER MILLION DOLLARS OF INITIAL EXPENDITURE
EMPLOYMENT
14.5(JOBS)
INCOME
$
428451.9
STATE TAXES
$
65645.3
LOCAL TAXES = $
38977.5
VALUE ADDED
$
' 682623.4

EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION TABLE
ENGINEERS
AERONAUT. ENGINEERS
CHEMICAL ENGINEERS
CIVIL ENGINEERS
ELEC. ENGINEERS
IND. ENGINEERS
MECH-. ENGINEERS
METAL & MTRLS ENGNRS
MINING-PETRO ENGNRS
SALES & NEC ENGNRS

87.4
1.3
1.9
37.2
15.6
8.1
11.2
10.8

COMPUTER SPECIALISTS
COMPUTER PROGRAMMERS
COMPUTER ANALYSTS
CMPTR SPCLSTS & NEC

18.9
.10.8
6.7
1.5

HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
HEALTH TECHNOLOGISTS
NURSES, THERPSTS, ...
PHY S . ,D ENT. , ...

29.9
5.5
12.7
11.7

ENG. & SCI. TECHS
AGRI BIO TECHNICIANS
CHEMICAL TECHNICIANS
DRAFTSMEN
ELECTRCL TECHNICIANS
INDUST ENGNR TECHNCS
MECH. ENG. TECH.
MATH TECHNICIANS
NEC TECHNICIANS

71.1
1.6
2.7
29.1
8.3

28.2

TEACHERS, EX. COLLEG
PRE K, K- 6 TEACHERS
7 - 12 TEACHERS

16.3
7.1
9.2

WRITERS, & ARTISTS
EDITORS + REPORTERS
PUBLIC RELATIONS
NEC WRITERS & ARTSTS

66.1
5.9
5.4
54.7

RELIG,SOC,TEACH PROF

40.0

.7
·7

·8

.4
•0

RELIGIOUS WORDERS
SOCIAL SC I ENTISTS
SOC & REC WORKERS
POST- SEC TEACHERS

13 . 3
8.4

15 . 8
2.4

EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION TABLE (CONT.)
PROF., TECH. NEC
ACCOUNTANTS
AIRLINE TECHNICIANS
ARCHITECTS
FARM AND ENVIRONMENT
LAWYERS AND JUDGES
LIBRARIANS
BIO & PHYS SCIENTSTS
MATH SPECIALISTS
SYSTEMS ANALYSTS
LABOR RELATION WRKRS
NEC RSRCH WRKRS
NEC TECHNCS & ENGNRS
VOCATNL & ED CNSLRS

179.0
69 . 7
1.9
9. 6
1.2
51.0
1.9
9.6
2.0

MANAGERS & ADMINIST.
FINANCIAL MANAGERS
FARM PRODUCTS MANGRS
WHOLSL & RETL BUYERS
HEALTH ADMINISTRATRS
INSPECTORS
NEC PUBLC ADMNSTRTRS
RAILROAD CONDUCTORS
RESTAURANT MANAGERS
SALES MANAGERS
COLLEGE ADMNSTRTRS
1 - 12 SCHOOL ADMINS
NEC ADMINISTRATORS

747.4

4.3

17.4
4.2

4.9
1.3
28.3
1.1
8.1
1.8
1.6
6.8
•0

30 . 0
31 . 1
.2

1.1
637.1

SALES WORKERS
SALES & ADVERT AGNTS
INSURANCE AGENTS
REAL ESTATE AGENTS
STOCK & BOND BROKRS
NEC SALES WORKERS

286 . 1
3.9
27.5
216 . 7

CLERICAL WORKERS

783.8

34 . 7
3.4

INSURANCE ADJUSTERS
INFO PROCESS WRKRS
SECRETARIES
NEC CLERICL & KINDRD

8.0
36 . 9
194.4
544.5

CONST. CRAFTSMEN
ELECTRIC LINEMEN
ELECTRICIANS
TELEPHONE INSTALLERS
NEC CONSTRUCTION

1425.2
11.7
154 . 4
12 . 6
1246 . 5

CRAFTSMEN, EX . CONST
FORGE- & HAMMER- MEN
FURNITURE FINISHERS
LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS
MACHINISTS
REPAIR & MECHANICS
PRINTING TRADES
SHEET METAL WORKERS
TOOL AND DIE MAKERS
: NEC CRAFTSMEN

548 . 8
1.2
.8
.1

17.3
218 . 6
10.3
38.1
6.2
256.2

EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION TABLE (CONT.)
OPERATIVES, EX. TRAN
MACHINE OPERATIVES
TEXTILE OPERATIVES
NEC OPERATIVES

482.3
13.0
1.5
467.8

TRANSP. EQUIP. OPERe
MASS TRANSIT WORKERS
RAILROAD BRAKEMEN
TRUCK DRIVERS
NEC TRANSIT OPER'S

272.7
17 . 1
197.1
58.1

LABORERS
CONSTRUCT LABORERS
OTHER LABORERS

578.3
436.5
141.8

PERS. SERV o WORKERS
CLEANING WORKERS
FOOD SERVICE WORKERS
HEALTH ASSTS
PERSONAL SERVICE
PROTCTV SRVC

407 . 1
83 . 4
182 . 2
20.3
88.8
32 . 4

GOVERN . ,UNALLOCABLE

.4

32.4

LRT ECONOMIC IMPACT ESTIMATE: OPERATIONS PHASE ($15.3 m)
(EMPLOYMENT IN JOBS, NOT FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS)
(DOLLAR FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)
.
EMPLOYMENT

4.0
10.0
508.0
8.7
40.8
14.7
31.2

2.5
11.0
1.1
216.9
1161.4
15338.0
698.0
1099.3
933.5
1268.7

6.3
.0

DIRECT EFFECTS
INDIRECT AND INDUCED EFFECTS
TOTAL EFFECTS
MULTIPLIERS

AGRICULTURE
AGRI. SERV., FORESTRY, & FISH
MINING
CONS.TRUCTION
MANUFACTURING
TRANSPORT. & PUBLIC UTILITIES
WHOLESALE
RETAIL TRADE
FINANCE, INS., & REAL ESTATE
SERVICES

8252.6

ST TAXES-VISITORS =
INDIRECT ST TAXES =
TOTAL STATE TAXES =

.0
1483.7
1483.7

LOC TAXES-VISITORS=
INDIRECT LOC TAXES=
TOTAL LOCAL TAXES =

.0
900.3
900.3

GEN. FEDERAL TAXES=
SOC SECURITY TAXES=
TOT. FEDERAL TAXES=

1521.8
1081.1
2602.9

OTHER VALUE ADDED
TOTAL VALUE ADDED

VALUE ADDED

.5

.8

3.6
126.0
309.1
8160.0
257.2
486.5
298.2
593.1

4.5
.7
216.9
455.3
10061.7
419.3
667.1
543.8
766.4

222.2

94.2

96.6

•0

•0

.0

497.9
126.2
624.1

14536.7
6415.9
20952.6

7908.1
2420.7
10328.8

9613.5
3619.5
13233.0

1.253

1.441

1.306

1.376

.0
.3
.0

GOVERNMENT
ADMIN. AUXILIARY

WAGES-NET OF TAXES=

WAGES

OUTPUT

.4

-6.5
13233.0

DIRECT EXPENDITURES WITHIN REGION
DIRECT EXPENDITURES IN OTHER REGIONS
TOTAL INITIAL EXPENDITURE

14536.7
763.3
15300.0

EFFECTS PER MILLION DOLLARS OF INITIAL EXPENDITURE
EMPLOYMENT
40.8(JOBS)
INCOME
$
675083.5
STATE TAXES = $
96972.7
LOCAL TAXES
$
58843.8
VALUE ADDED
$
864900.6

LRT ECONOMIC IMPACT ESTIMATE: OPERATIONS PHASE ($15.3

m)

(EMPLOYMENT IN JOBS, NOT FULL- TIME EQUIVALENTS)
(DOLLAR FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)
EMPLOYMENT
AGRICULTURE
DAIRY PROD., POULTRY, & EGGS
MEAT ANIMALS & MISC. LIVESTOCK
COTTON
GRAINS, & MISC. CROPS
TOBACCO
FRUITS, NUTS, & VEGETABLES
FOREST PROD.
GREENHOUSE & NURSERY PROD.
AGRI. SERV., FORESTRY, & FISH
AGRI. SERVICES (07)
FORESTRY ( 08)
FISHING,HUNTING,&TRAPPING (09)
MINING
METAL MINING (10)
ANTHRACITE MINING (11)
BITUM. COAL & LIGNITE (12)
OIL & GAS EXTRACTION (13)
NONMETAL MIN.-EX. FUELS (14)
CONSTRUCTION
GENERAL BLDG. CONTRACTORS (15)
HEAVY. CONST. CONTRACTORS (16) .
SPECIAL TRADE CONTRACTORS (17)
MANUFACTURING
FOOD & KINDRED PROD. (20)
TOBACCO MANUFACTURES (21)
TEXTILE MILL PROD. (22)
APPAREL & OTHER PROD. (23)
LUMBER & WOOD PROD. (24)
FURNITURE &. FIXTURES ( 25)
PAPER & ALLIED PROD. (26)
PRINTING & PUBLISHING (27)
CHEMICALS & ALLIED PROD. (28)
PETROLEUM & COAL PROD. (29)
RUBBER & MISC. PLASTICS (30)
LEATHER & LEATHER PROD. (31)
STONE, CLAY, & GLASS (32)
PRIMARY METAL PROD. (33)
FABRICATED METAL PROD. (34)
MACHINERY, EXCEPT ELEC. (35)
ELECTRIC & ELEC. EQUIP. (36)
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT (37)
INSTRUMENTS & REL. PROD. (38)
MISC. MANUFACTURING IND'S (39)
TRANSPORT. & PUBLIC UTILITIES
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION (40)
LOCAL PASS. TRANSIT (41)
TRUCKING & WAREHOUSING (42)
WATER TRANSPORTATION ( 44 )
TRANSPORTATION BY AIR (45)
PIPE . LINES - EX. NAT. GAS ( 46)
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES (47)

OUTPUT

WAGES

VALUE ADDED

.5

•0

2.5
2.0

.0
•0

•0
•0

.0

•0

•0

•0
•0

.5

.2

•0

•
•
•
•

.0
.0
.0

•0
•0

·0

•0

.0

•0
.0
.0
•3
•2
.0
•0
•0
•0
•0
•0
·0

·0

4.0

1.1
•3

2.7
10.0
2.0
•0

•2
·3
·1
·1
•3

2.4
•
•
·
·

3
0
1
0

·4
·1

1.1
·7
·9
.8

·1
.2

508.0
•0

503.5
1.6
•0
·1
•0

.2

0
0
0
0

.4

.8
•5

.3

•0

11.0
10.4

3.6
3.5

4.5
4.3

·5
·1
1.1

·1

.2

•0

·1

·0
·0
•0
·0

.4
•0

•0
•0

·7
•0
•0
•0

·0

•0

1.1

.4

216.9
57.3
25.1
134.5
1161.4
342.7

126.0
33.1
14.8
78.1
309.1
52.1

•7

•0

11.0
19.7
10.1
3.9
37.6
158.5
64.4
6.2
10.3
3.7
29.4
13.0
127.6
73.7
81.8

150.8
7.2
9.8
15338.0
•0

14700.6
113.6
1.9
6.9
•0

7.1

·0

3.5
6.3
3.4
1.3
10.3
58.6
12.5
.7

3.0
1.3
10.6
4.7
39.2
24.2
29.7
42.0
2.4
3.3

8160.0
.0

7997.3
51.0
.4

2.9
.0

3.4

216.9
57.3
25.1
134.5
455.3
85.8
•0

5.0
7.8
3.4
1.5
13.9
72.5
21.1
1.1
3.9
1.6
13.1
4.9
63.0
37.1
40.3
70.7
3.7
4.8
10061.7
•0

9721.9
73.7
•7

3.8
•0

4.5

COMMUNICATION (48)
ELEC.,GAS,&SANITARY SERVo

(49)

WHOLESALE
WHLSALE - DURABLE- GOODS (50)
WHLSALE~ NONDURABLE GOODS (51)
RETAIL TRADE
BLDG. MAT. - GARDEN SUPPLY (52)
GENERAL MERCH. STORES (53)
FOOD STORES (54)
AUTO. DEALERS - SERV. STAT. (55)
APPAREL & ACCESS. STORES (56)
FURNITURE & HOME FURNISH. (57)
EATING & DRINKING PLACES (58)
MISCELLANEOUS RETAIL (59)
FINANCE, INS.,&REAL ESTATE
BANKING (60)
CREDIT AGENCIES EX. BANKS (61)
SECURITY, COMM ~ BROKERS (62)
INSURANCE CARRIERS (63)
INS. AGENTS, BROKERS (64)
REAL ESTATE (65)
COMB. REAL ESTATE, INS. (66)
HOLDING- OTH. INV .. OFF'S (67)
SERVICES
HOTELS & OTHER LODGING (70)
PERSONAL SERVICES (72)
BUSINESS SERVICES (73)
AUTO REPAIR,SERV.,GARAGES (75)
MISC. REPAIR SERVICES (76)
MOTION PICTURES (78)
AMUSEMENT & RECREATION (79)
HEALTH SERVICES (80)
LEGAL SERVICES (81)
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES (82)
SOCIAL SERVICES (83)
MUSEUMS,BOTAN - ZOO.GARDENS (84)
MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS (86)
MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES (89)
GOVERNMENT
ADMIN. AUXILIARY
TOTAL
MULTIPLIERS
WAGES - NET OF TAXES=

8252.6

TOTAL STATE TAXES =

1483.7

TOTAL LOCAL TAXES

900.3

OTHER ,VALUE ADDED
TOTAL VALUE ADDED

- 6.5
13233 . 0

1.3
1.2

131 . 1
376.7

55.2
49.8

92.9
164.1

8.7
3.9
4.9
40 . 8
1.4
4.8
5.0
4.5
2.2
1.1
12.4
9.5
14.7
3.5

698.0
401 . 6
296 . 4
1099.3
49.2
161 . 2
125.3
187 . 9
63.3
' 45.5
282.0
184.9
933.5
196.7

257.2
124.3
132.8
486.5
22.7
58.4
58.5
94.6
23.1
19.7
102.8
106.7
298.2
89.4

419.3
241 . 3
178.1
667 . 1
31.6
103.6
80.5
12,0 .7
40.7
29.2
141.9
118.8
543.8
114.2

•0

.4
3.1
2.0
4.8

•0

•0

14.4
101.5
87.0
28.2
22.7
·7
39.6
19.9

17.6
136.7 ,
107.0
28.7
27.0

6.3

222.2

94.2

96.6

•0

•0

•0

•0

624.1
1.253

20952 . 6
1.441

10328.8
1.306

13233.0
1.376

. '1

.8
31.2
·9

5.0
5.4
4.7
•6
·1

1.3
3.9
1.8
1.8
2.0
•0

2.8
.8

22.4
93.1
54.9
24.4

.0

37.2
324 . 7
94.2
240.9
4.8
35.0
1268.7
20.0 ,
113.7
198.3
297.9
18.5
2.5
43.3
198.8
145.0
57.2
44.0
1.6
97.6
30 . 3

.5

13.5
593.1
7 .4 ,

56.0
102.9
102.5
9.4
·8

18.2
137.7
69.5
189.8
3.8
10.5
766.4
10.5
80.2
133.1
139.8
12.3
1.1

.8

51.6
20.1

TOTAL INITIAL EXPENDITURE

15300.0

EFFECTS PER MILLION DOLLARS OF INITIAL EXPENDITURE
EMPLOYMENT
40.8 (JOBS)
INCOME
$
675083.5
STATE TAXES = $
96972.7
LOCAL TAXES
$
58843.8
VALUE ADDED
$
864900.6

EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION TABLE
ENGINEERS
AERONAUT. ENGINEERS
CHEMICAL ~NGINEERS
CIVIL ENGINEERS
ELEC. ENGINEERS
IND. ENGINEERS
MECH. ENGINEERS
METAL & MTRLS ENGNRS
MINING-PETRO ENGNRS
SALES & NEC ENGNRS

1.8
.0
.0
.5
.6
.2
.2
.0
.0
.2

COMPUTER SPECIALISTS
COMPUTER PROGRAMMERS
COMPUTER ANALYSTS
CMPTR SPCLSTS & NEC

.7
.4
.2
.0

HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
HEALTH TECHNOLOGISTS
NURSES, THERPSTS,...
PHY S . , DENT. , . . .

1.7
.4
.7
.7

ENG. & SCI. TECHS
AGRI BIO TECHNICIANS
CHEMICAL TECHNICIANS
DRAFTSMEN
ELECTRCL TECHNICIANS
INDUST ENGNR TECHNCS
MECH. ENG. TECH.
MATH TECHNICIANS
NEC TECHNICIANS

1.0
.0
.0
.4
.2
.0
.0
.0
.3

TEACHERS, E~. COLLEG
PRE K, K-6 TEACHERS
7-12 TEACHERS

.9
.4
.5

WRITERS, & ARTISTS
EDITORS + REPORTERS
PUBLIC RELATIONS
NEe WRITERS & ARTSTS

2.2
.4
.4
1.5

RELIG,SOC,TEACH PROF

2.1

RELIGIOUS WaRDERS
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
SOC & REC WORKERS
POST - SEC TEACHERS

·8
.3
•9
·1

EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION TABLE (CaNT.)
PROF., TECH. NEC
ACCOUNTANTS
AIRLINE TECHNICIANS
ARCHITECTS
FARM AND ENVIRONMENT
LAWYERS AND JUDGES
LIBRARIANS
BIO & PHYS SCIENTSTS
MATH SPECIALISTS
SYSTEMS ANALYSTS
LABOR RELATION WRKRS
NEC RSRCH WRKRS
NEC TECHNCS & ENGNRS
VOCATNL & ED CNSLRS
MANAGERS & ADMINIST.
FINANCIAL MANAGERS
FARM PRODUCTS MANGRS
WHOLSL & RETL BUYERS
HEALTH ADMINISTRATRS
INSPECTORS
NEC PUBLC ADMNSTRTRS
RAILROAD CONDUCTORS
RESTAURANT MANAGERS
SALES MANAGERS
COLLEGE ADMNSTRTRS
1 - 12 SCHOOL ADMINS
NEC ADMINISTRATORS

6.9
2.3
·1

·1
·1

1.0
·1
•2

·1
.2

1.2
·1

1.4
·1

29.1
1.3
•0
.4
·1
·1
•4
·0

1.6
1.4
·0
·1

23.7

SALES WORKERS
SALES & ADVERT AGNTS
INSURANCE AGENTS
REAL ESTATE AGENTS
STOCK & BOND BROKRS
NEC SALES WORKERS

1.8
2.1
.2
10 . 4

CLERICAL WORKERS

61 . 6

14.7
.2

